Petition Under Section 482 CrPC Is Not Maintainable Where Efficacious Alternative Remedy of Revision Is Available

The petitioners filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), seeking to quash an order dated 07.05.2013.

The impugned order, passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gwalior, took cognizance of offences under Sections 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against the petitioners.

The petitioners approached the High Court directly to challenge the legality and correctness of the cognizance order.

1. Whether a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is maintainable when a specific statutory remedy of revision is available under the Code.

2. Whether the order taking cognizance and issuing process is an interlocutory order or an intermediate order amenable to revisional jurisdiction.

The Court applied Section 482 Cr.P.C. regarding inherent powers and Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. regarding revisional jurisdiction.

It relied on *Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra*, which established that orders substantially affecting the rights of the accused are intermediate, not interlocutory, and thus subject to revision.

It further cited *Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander*, holding that statutory remedies should not be bypassed for inherent jurisdiction.

It further cited *Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra*, which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies unless exceptional circumstances exist.

The Court reasoned that an order taking cognizance and issuing process is an "intermediate order" because it substantially affects the rights of the accused; therefore, it is not barred by the prohibition on revising interlocutory orders.

The Court observed that the grounds raised by the petitioners—challenging the correctness and propriety of the cognizance—fall squarely within the ambit of revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C.

Since the petitioners failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances, such as a legal bar to proceedings or manifest mala fides, the Court found no justification for the direct invocation of its inherent powers under Section 482.

The Court concluded that entertaining the petition would result in an improper circumvention of the statutory procedure provided by the legislature.

The petition was dismissed with liberty granted to the petitioners to file a revision petition before the competent Sessions Court.

The Court clarified that the Sessions Court should decide the matter on its own merits without being influenced by the High Court's observations.