Plaints creating an illusory cause of action through clever drafting must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11.

The appellant (plaintiff) filed a suit in 2009 for specific performance of a registered agreement to sell (Banakhat) dated 13.10.1997

The agreement involved a 1/3 share of ancestral land, which the original defendant (Kamlaben) allegedly agreed to sell at a fixed rate, subject to obtaining government permissions for partition within three years (by 13.10.2000)

In 2001, the defendants executed a registered sale deed conveying the entire land to third parties (Defendants 2 and 3), followed by a subsequent registered sale to Defendants 4–6 in 2006

The plaintiff instituted Special Civil Suit No. 590 of 2009 on 06.10.2009, asserting that he only discovered the prior sales two to three months before filing when the defendants gave evasive replies

The Trial Court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, holding the suit was barred by limitation

1. Whether the suit for specific performance was barred by the law of limitation under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC given the execution of registered sale deeds in 2001 and 2006

2. Whether the plaintiff’s averments regarding the "date of knowledge" constituted "clever drafting" to create an illusion of a cause of action

The court applied Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides for the rejection of a plaint where the suit is ex-facie barred by law

It relied on the principle of "clever drafting" as articulated in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (2020) 7 SCC 366 and Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal (2017) 13 SCC 174, which mandates that Courts "nip in the bud" bogus litigation created by an illusion of a cause of action

Additionally, the court applied Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, regarding constructive notice of registered instruments, citing Janardhanam Prasad v. Ramdas (2007) 15 SCC 174 to establish that a party is deemed to have notice of a fact if they would have known it but for gross negligence or willful abstention from search

The Court found the suit to be "hopelessly time-barred"

It observed that the 1997 agreement stipulated a three-year window for performance, which expired in 2000, yet the plaintiff remained inactive until 2009

Upon inspecting the original record, the Court noted physical "interpolations" and handwritten additions in the plaint concerning the date of knowledge and revenue entry 2920, indicating a deliberate attempt to circumvent the three-year limitation period

The Court rejected the argument that limitation was a mixed question of fact and law in this instance; since the subsequent sale deeds of 2001 and 2006 were registered documents and revenue entries were mutated, the plaintiff had constructive notice of the transactions under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act

The Court characterized the plaintiff’s claim of recent knowledge as "nothing but a camouflage" and "clever drafting" intended to revive a dead claim and abuse the judicial process

It held that registered documents serve as public notice, and a plaintiff cannot plead ignorance of such records to extend the limitation period

The High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment rejecting the plaint, deeming the suit a vexatious litigation resulting in an abuse of the process of the Court