Plea of alibi involving disputed questions of fact cannot be examined in proceedings for quashing of FIR.

The petitioner sought quashing of FIR No. 53/2025 registered at P.S. Dimani for offences under Sections 115(2), 118(1), 296, 351(2), and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.

The complainant alleged that on April 20, 2025, the petitioner and co-accused assaulted him and his relatives with sticks and an axe due to prior enmity.

The petitioner moved the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, contending that the FIR was a "counterblast" to a prior FIR lodged by the petitioner's father (FIR No. 52/2025) and raised a plea of alibi, claiming he was in New Delhi at the time of the incident.

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash an FIR based on a plea of alibi and the existence of a cross-case.

2. Whether a delay in lodging the FIR and the presence of disputed facts warrant the dismissal of criminal proceedings at the threshold.

The court primarily applied Section 528 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 of the CrPC) regarding inherent powers of the High Court.

It relied on *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal*, which established that quashing power must be exercised sparingly and only in the "rarest of rare cases".

The court applied the principle from *R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab* that proceedings are quashable only if allegations do not constitute an offence or are inherently improbable.

Regarding alibi, the court invoked *Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor*, holding that only "unimpeachable and sterling quality material" can be considered at this stage.

For cross-cases, it cited *Nathi Lal v. State of U.P.* and *Sudhir v. State of M.P.*, which mandate that such cases should be tried together by the same Judge rather than being quashed.

The Court reasoned that the inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS cannot be used to conduct a "mini-trial" by evaluating the reliability of allegations at the threshold.

Applying the *Habib Abdullah Jeelani* principle, the Court held that the petitioner's plea of alibi is a matter of evidence requiring trial-stage determination, as no "unimpeachable material" was produced to conclusively prove his absence from the crime scene.

The Court further determined that the existence of a cross-FIR (No. 52/2025) does not *ipso facto* render the impugned FIR false; rather, legal precedent requires both versions to be tested in trial to avoid conflicting judgments.

The court found the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, prima facie disclosed the commission of cognizable offences under the BNS.

The plea of alibi, being a disputed question of fact, must be adjudicated during trial.

However, the Court directed the Investigating Authority of Police Station Dimni to objectively consider the petitioner’s written representation (Annexure A/2) and conduct a fair investigation in accordance with law.