Facts
The prosecution arose from a written report alleging that, on 9 July 2019, the informant’s approximately fifteen-year-old granddaughter, Jyoti Kumari, was taken away on a motorcycle by Sourav Kumar for the purpose of forcible marriage. The present seven petitioners were alleged to have been present and to have assisted in the kidnapping.
Source reference: p. 2, para. 3The FIR was registered under Sections 363, 366-A and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
Source reference: p. 2, para. 3After investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet only against Sourav Kumar under Sections 366-A and 376 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act; the seven petitioners were not sent up for trial.
Source reference: p. 3, para. 4Nevertheless, the court below took cognizance against all eight accused under Sections 366-A and 376 IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act on 23 September 2019, and subsequently framed charges against them on 25 January 2021.
Source reference: p. 3, para. 5The petitioners invoked the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, corresponding to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of those orders and the proceedings qua them.
Source reference: p. 2, para. 2The victim’s statement under Section 161 CrPC did not attribute any act to the seven petitioners, and no specific overt act, role, conversation, restraint or identifiable assistance was alleged against any of them.
Source reference: p. 5, paras. 8–9Issues
Whether the cognizance order and order framing charge against the seven petitioners under Sections 366-A and 376 IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act could be sustained when the FIR and other materials attributed no specific act or role to them?
Source reference: p. 4–5, paras. 8–10Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC/Section 528 BNSS to quash the proceedings against the petitioners as an abuse of the process of court?
Source reference: p. 5, paras. 10–11Whether the alleged compromise, subsequent marriage and birth of children justified quashing of the POCSO prosecution?
Source reference: p. 3, para. 6Law Applied
The Court applied the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now corresponding to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, to prevent abuse of the process of court and secure the ends of justice.
Source reference: p. 2, para. 2It relied on Categories (1) and (7) of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, under which proceedings may be quashed where the allegations, even taken at their highest, do not constitute the alleged offences or where continuation of the prosecution would amount to an abuse of process.
Source reference: p. 5, para. 10The Court also recognised that a trial court may take cognizance against persons not sent up by the police, but such power must be founded on some material beyond mere naming in the FIR.
Source reference: p. 5, para. 9It further applied the principle in Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 INSC 846, that compromise, consent or subsequent marriage cannot ordinarily justify quashing a prosecution involving POCSO offences.
Source reference: p. 3, para. 6Reasoning
The Court distinguished the case from one based on compromise or subsequent marriage and examined whether the allegations independently disclosed offences against the petitioners.
Source reference: p. 3, para. 6The FIR contained only a general assertion that the petitioners were present and assisted Sourav Kumar in taking the victim away; it assigned no individual role or specific act to any petitioner.
Source reference: p. 4, para. 8More importantly, the victim’s Section 161 statement attributed no conduct whatsoever to them, and the investigating officer, after examining the case diary, found insufficient material to send them up for trial.
Source reference: p. 5, para. 9Although the trial court was legally empowered to take cognizance against persons not charge-sheeted, its order did not identify any material, apart from their names in the FIR, supporting the prosecution against these petitioners.
Source reference: p. 5, para. 9In the absence of allegations suggesting that they committed or participated in any act contemplated by Section 376 IPC or Section 8 of the POCSO Act, the foundational requirements of those offences were not prima facie satisfied. Continuing the prosecution on such vague and omnibus allegations therefore fell within Categories (1) and (7) of Bhajan Lal.
Source reference: p. 5, para. 10Holding
The High Court held that the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, did not prima facie constitute the offences alleged against the seven petitioners and that their continued prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of court.
It accordingly quashed the order dated 23 September 2019 taking cognizance and the order dated 25 January 2021 framing charge, insofar as they concerned Dilip Singh, Rubi Devi, Anandi Singh, Jay Karan Singh @ Jaykaran Ram, Subod[h] Singh, Vijay Singh and Kedar Nath Singh.
Source reference: p. 6, para. 12The entire criminal proceeding in Amarpur (Fullidumar) P.S. Case No. 334 of 2019/G.R. No. 99 of 2019 was quashed qua these seven petitioners only.
Source reference: p. 6, para. 12The Court clarified that the order did not affect the case of Sourav Kumar, who was not a petitioner.
Source reference: p. 3, para. 7Acts & Sections Cited
8 provisions across 4 statutes referred to in this judgment. Each provision opens on LawLens.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 20231
Indian Penal Code, 18603
Original Court PDF
DILIP SINGHvsThe State of Bihar
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