POCSO presumptions cannot apply where foundational facts and the accused’s identity remain unproved.

The appellant appealed his conviction under Section 376 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act, for which he was sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and fined ₹10,000

The prosecution alleged that the victim went missing after leaving for tuition on 12 April 2021; the initial FIR was registered against unknown persons, and the appellant was later charge-sheeted

At trial, the victim testified that the appellant and another accused raped her. In her statement under Section 164 CrPC, however, she described one petrol-pump employee as the assailant and did not name the appellant

The trial court relied principally on the victim’s testimony and evidence from her parents and another witness to convict the appellant

1. Whether the victim’s testimony, considered alongside her earlier statement and the other evidence, reliably established the alleged rape and the appellant’s involvement beyond reasonable doubt

2. Whether the appellant’s identity was sufficiently established where he was allegedly unknown to the victim, no test identification parade was held, and his identification in court was disputed

3. Whether the prosecution established the foundational facts necessary to rely on the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act

The prosecution was required to prove the charged offences and the appellant’s identity beyond reasonable doubt. Under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, the statutory presumptions could not assist the prosecution unless the foundational facts of the alleged offence were established

Where an accused is a stranger to a witness and no test identification parade has been conducted, the court must exercise caution in relying on dock identification; whether a parade was necessary depends on the circumstances of the case (P. Sasikumar v. State, (2024) 8 SCC 600, paras. 23–25, quoted at pp. 14–15, para. 24).

Evidence of a prosecution witness who has not been declared hostile may also be relied upon by the defence (Javed Masood v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 3 SCC 538, paras. 20–21, quoted at pp. 16–17, para. 24.1).

The Court found material differences between the victim’s Section 164 statement and her trial testimony: the earlier statement did not name the appellant or the co-accused and attributed the assault to one petrol-pump employee, while the trial account implicated the appellant and another person. The parents’ accounts also differed as to who was involved

The medical examination disclosed no bodily signs of violence or clinical evidence of rape, a circumstance the Court considered alongside—not in isolation from—the inconsistencies in the testimony

The appellant was not shown to have been previously known to the victim, no test identification parade was held, and the Court considered the first-time dock identification insufficient in these circumstances

Further, PW-6 testified that the appellant was on leave on the relevant day, and the investigating officer acknowledged investigative omissions

Taken together, these matters left the occurrence and the appellant’s identity unproved to the required standard; the statutory presumptions therefore could not sustain the conviction

It allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, and directed the appellant’s release forthwith unless his custody was required in another case