POCSO presumptions cannot replace proof of foundational facts establishing the alleged sexual assault.

The appellant was prosecuted under Sections 376 and 506 of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act for allegedly committing rape and threatening an 11-year-old girl on 9 April 2015 at approximately 7:00 a.m.

The prosecution examined seven witnesses, including the medical officer, investigating officers, the victim’s mother and maternal grandmother, and the victim.

The trial court found the appellant guilty under Section 4 of the POCSO Act and sentenced him to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹25,000, while acquitting him under Sections 376 and 506 IPC.

In appeal, the victim denied that any occurrence had taken place, stated that she had not made any incriminating statement to the police, and acknowledged that she and her mother had compromised the matter.

The medical examination found no external injury, an intact hymen, no spermatozoa, and only redness on the right labia minora; the doctor opined that attempted sexual intercourse “might have been done,” explaining that this meant it “may or may not be done”.

The mother and grandmother also did not provide reliable direct evidence, and the grandmother’s testimony indicated that she was present in the house at the alleged time of occurrence, contrary to the prosecution case that the victim was alone.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed penetrative sexual assault punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act.

Whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act could be invoked without the prosecution first establishing the foundational facts of the alleged offence.

Whether the sentence of 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment was legally permissible for an alleged offence committed in 2015, when the enhanced punishment under Section 4 of the POCSO Act came into force only on 16 August 2019.

The Court applied Section 4 of the POCSO Act, which, before its amendment effective from 16 August 2019, prescribed imprisonment of not less than seven years and up to life imprisonment for penetrative sexual assault.

Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act permit presumptions regarding culpable mental state and commission of the offence, but such presumptions arise only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of the alleged offence.

The Court reaffirmed the presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s obligation to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, relying on Ramanand v. State of U.P., AIR 2022 SC 5273, including the principle that the accused may rebut the statutory burden on a preponderance of probabilities.

It also considered Section 22 of the POCSO Act, which provides punishment for false complaints or false information made with the intention to humiliate, extort, threaten or defame.

The enhanced punishment introduced by the 2019 amendment could not be applied to an alleged offence committed in 2015.

The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the basic facts necessary to attract the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30.

The victim, the principal witness, completely denied the occurrence and stated that she had not made any incriminating statement to the police; moreover, the prosecution failed to prove through the investigating officer the alleged prior statement attributed to her.

The medical evidence was inconclusive: there was no injury, the hymen was intact, no spermatozoa were detected, and the opinion that intercourse “might have been done” expressly included the possibility that it may not have occurred.

The neighbour was merely a hearsay witness, while the mother admitted that she had not witnessed the occurrence, had compromised the case, and did not know who had informed her.

The grandmother’s evidence further contradicted the prosecution’s assertion that the victim was alone at the relevant time.

In these circumstances, the trial court erred by relying on the POCSO presumptions to supply the missing proof and by simultaneously finding that the prosecution had not proved the appellant’s involvement under Section 376 IPC.

The Court also held that the 20-year sentence was based on an amendment that was not in force when the alleged offence occurred.

The appellant was directed to be released forthwith unless wanted in another case.

The Court granted him liberty to take appropriate legal steps under Section 22 of the POCSO Act in respect of the alleged false complaint, subject to consideration by the competent court or investigating agency on its own merits and in accordance with law.