POCSO proceedings cannot be quashed solely on the basis of a compromise between the parties.

The petitioner invoked Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of FIR Crime No. 77/2026 registered at Police Station Dabra Dehat, District Gwalior, for offences under Sections 137(2), 64(1) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and Sections 5/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, along with consequential proceedings in Sessions Case No. 18/2026, on the basis of compromise.

The prosecution case arose from a missing report lodged by the complainant concerning her minor daughter’s disappearance during the night of 29–30 June 2026; during investigation, the prosecutrix was recovered, and the prosecution alleged that the petitioner had taken her away.

After filing of the charge-sheet and commencement of trial, the prosecutrix and her father sought to settle the dispute with the petitioner through an application supported by affidavits.

The Principal Registrar verified the parties, their signatures, and the voluntariness of the compromise, finding no threat, inducement, or coercion.

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings for offences under the POCSO Act solely on the basis of a compromise between the parties?

Whether the precedents permitting quashing of POCSO proceedings after the accused’s marriage with the prosecutrix applied where the petitioner had not married the prosecutrix?

The Court applied Section 528 of the BNSS, which preserves the High Court’s inherent power to make orders necessary to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of the process of the court; this power must be exercised sparingly and with circumspection.

Relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Court reiterated that heinous or serious offences having a social impact ordinarily cannot be quashed merely because the parties have compromised.

The Court also considered Mahesh Mukund Patel v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 614, and Ajay Mohan v. State of U.P., 2026 AHC 103624, but treated them as fact-specific decisions involving marriage between the accused and the prosecutrix.

Offences under the POCSO Act were regarded as offences against society and not merely private disputes, such that a private compromise cannot override the statutory object of protecting children from sexual offences.

Although the compromise was verified as voluntary, the allegations involved offences under the POCSO Act concerning a minor prosecutrix.

The Court distinguished Mahesh Mukund Patel and Ajay Mohan because, unlike those cases, the petitioner had not married the prosecutrix; consequently, the factual basis for permitting quashing in those decisions was absent.

Applying the principles governing inherent jurisdiction, the Court held that the serious and socially injurious nature of POCSO offences made them unsuitable for quashing merely on the basis of settlement.

Permitting such quashing would undermine the protective purpose of the POCSO Act and conflict with the Supreme Court’s limitations on the exercise of inherent powers in serious offences.

The petition under Section 528 of the BNSS was therefore dismissed, and all pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.