POCSO Section 29 presumption arises only after prosecution establishes foundational facts through reliable evidence.

The prosecutrix, a Class IX student, was reported missing on 16 August 2023, pursuant to which FIR No. 695/2023 was registered at P.S. Bawana under Section 363 IPC.

She was recovered with the appellant from Ambala Railway Station on 23 August 2023.

In her Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement, she stated that she and the appellant were in a relationship, had voluntarily travelled to Ambala, established physical relations consensually, and married at a temple.

In her subsequent Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement and trial testimony, she alleged that the appellant had threatened her with a knife, taken her to a factory, committed sexual acts against her, and threatened her family.

The appellant was charged under Sections 366, 376(2)(n) and 506(II) IPC and Sections 5(l)/6 of the POCSO Act.

The Trial Court convicted him on 6 October 2025 and sentenced him, inter alia, to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 6 POCSO, with sentences running concurrently.

The appellant challenged the conviction and sentence in the present appeal under Sections 415(2) and 528 BNSS.

1. Whether the material inconsistencies between the prosecutrix’s statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. and her trial testimony rendered her evidence unreliable for sustaining the appellant’s conviction

2. Whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act could be invoked without the prosecution first proving the foundational facts constituting the alleged offences

3. Whether the investigative deficiencies, including failure to establish the alleged place of occurrence and produce independent corroborative evidence, created a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case

4. Whether the appellant was entitled to acquittal on the benefit of doubt

The Court considered Sections 366, 376(2)(n) and 506(II) IPC and Sections 5(l) and 6 of the POCSO Act, under which the appellant had been convicted.

It applied Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, holding that the presumptions regarding commission of the offence and culpable mental state do not arise automatically upon registration of a POCSO case; the prosecution must first establish the foundational facts through cogent and reliable evidence.

The Court relied on Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal, which reiterated this limitation on the statutory presumptions.

The Court relied on Nirmal Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), which held that materially inconsistent testimony and failure to prove foundational facts warrant benefit of doubt.

The Court relied on State of Uttarakhand v. Sanjay Ram Tamta, which held that material omissions and subsequent improvements may undermine the prosecution case.

The Court relied on Alamelu v. State, which recognised that conviction may rest solely on the prosecutrix’s testimony only when it is free from material infirmities and inherent improbabilities.

Although the prosecutrix’s minority made consent legally immaterial, it did not dispense with the prosecution’s obligation to prove the essential ingredients of the charged offences.

The Court found that the prosecutrix’s Section 161 statement described a voluntary relationship, consensual physical relations, travel to Ambala, and a temple marriage, whereas her Section 164 statement attributed forcible abduction, threats, and sexual assault to the appellant.

These differences concerned the genesis and essential circumstances of the prosecution case, rather than minor discrepancies.

Since the prosecution’s case substantially depended on the prosecutrix’s testimony, the material improvements required heightened scrutiny under the applicable principles.

The Trial Court had incorrectly treated the Section 29 presumption as automatically applicable merely because the appellant was being tried under Section 6 POCSO, without first determining whether the foundational facts had been reliably established.

The failure to identify and prove the alleged place of occurrence, prepare a site plan, examine the factory owner or witness Ranjeet, or produce call-detail records and other independent corroboration further weakened the prosecution case, particularly in light of the inconsistent testimony.

Accordingly, the prosecution failed to prove the charged offences beyond reasonable doubt.

The High Court set aside the judgment of conviction dated 6 October 2025 and the order on sentence dated 3 December 2025.

The appellant was acquitted of the offences under Sections 366, 376(2)(n) and 506(II) IPC and Section 5(l), punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, by extending to him the benefit of doubt.

He was directed to be released forthwith unless required in another case, and all pending applications were disposed of.