Police aid for injunction enforcement is a continuous procedural mechanism not barred by the principle of res judicata.

The respondent (plaintiff) filed a suit (O.S. No. 1708/2024) for declaration and injunction regarding 'B' schedule property, claiming ownership via an unregistered Will.

The Trial Court granted a temporary injunction in favor of the plaintiff, which was subsequently affirmed by the High Court in MFA and the Supreme Court in SLP.

Despite the subsistence of this injunction, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, aided by "goonda elements" and the local police, forcibly interfered with his possession and manhandled his family, supported by photographic evidence.

The plaintiff filed I.A. No. VIII under Section 151 CPC seeking police assistance to implement the injunction.

The Trial Court allowed the application, directing the SHO, Whitefield Police Station, to remove obstructions and implement the order.

The petitioners (defendants) challenged this order, contending that they were in actual possession and that the application was barred by res judicata due to previous similar prayers for police aid.

The Court applied Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, regarding the inherent powers of the Court to prevent abuse of process and ensure the ends of justice.

It relied on the principle from Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, which establishes that a person in settled possession is entitled to protection even against a rightful owner, who must seek recourse through due process of law rather than forcible self-help.

The Court further applied the principle that res judicata under Section 11 CPC does not apply to procedural mechanisms like police aid, which are necessitated by fresh acts of obstruction.

The Court emphasized its duty to ensure that judicial orders do not remain "paper orders".

The Court rejected the petitioners' res judicata argument, reasoning that police aid is a procedural mechanism rather than a substantive remedy; thus, every fresh act of obstruction constitutes a new cause for the Court to invoke its ancillary jurisdiction.

Regarding possession, the Court noted that the Trial Court had already found the plaintiff to be in possession when granting the injunction—a finding affirmed up to the Supreme Court.

The Court held that the petitioners could not plead their own high-handed or contemptuous acts of forceful entry as a defense to claim "actual possession" to frustrate an existing injunction.

The Court distinguished the current scenario from a suit for possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, stating that the Court’s inherent power to enforce its own subsisting orders is necessary to maintain the rule of law and public confidence.

The Court highlighted the "shameful" conduct of the police and the petitioners' blatant disregard for judicial hierarchy.

The Court held that the principle of res judicata does not apply to recurring needs for police aid to implement a subsisting injunction.

The Court affirmed that the police must assist in removing obstructions created in violation of the Court's order to restore the efficacy of the injunction.

Finding the petitioners' conduct to be an abuse of the process of law, the Court imposed costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid to the respondent.