POSH appellate authorities must assess prejudice from procedural defects and fully appraise the Internal Committee’s findings.

A workplace sexual-harassment complaint alleged incidents on 2 and 20 November 2021.

After an inquiry, the Internal Committee (IC) found against Rakesh Gupta and recommended disciplinary action; Axis Bank dismissed him on 23 February 2022.

Gupta appealed under Section 18 of the POSH Act.

On 7 August 2023, the Industrial Tribunal allowed the appeal, set aside the IC’s findings and the consequential dismissal, and relied substantially on the conclusion that Gupta had been denied cross-examination.

Axis Bank and the complainant separately challenged that order before the Delhi High Court.

The High Court noted that the complainant had emailed a bank official about the first incident on 10 November 2021, contrary to the Tribunal’s finding that no complaint followed that incident.

1. Whether the Tribunal properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction under Section 18 of the POSH Act by examining the IC’s findings and recommendations on the record as a whole.

2. Whether any alleged denial of cross-examination or other procedural deficiency required interference absent an examination of resulting prejudice and the overall fairness of the hearing.

3. Whether the High Court should decide the merits itself or remit the appeal for fresh consideration by the statutory Appellate Authority.

Section 18 of the POSH Act permits an aggrieved person to appeal specified IC recommendations or their non-implementation; the appellate forum must examine the correctness of the IC’s report and findings (Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 164).

Under State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, a procedural violation does not ordinarily invalidate disciplinary proceedings unless it causes prejudice, except where the breach amounts to a fundamental denial of notice, opportunity, or hearing.

The ultimate test for a claimed breach of natural justice is whether the person received a fair hearing and suffered prejudice, not whether a procedural irregularity occurred in isolation (Ajay Tiwari v. University of Delhi, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4390; S. Janaki Iyer v. Union of India, (2025) 8 SCC 696).

The High Court also referred to Delhi University v. Bidyug Chakraborty, SLP (C) No. 23060/2009, concerning the use of written questionnaires as a means of cross-examination in sensitive proceedings.

The Tribunal’s conclusion that Gupta had been denied cross-examination substantially informed its decision, but it did not determine whether the procedure actually deprived him of a fair and effective opportunity to meet the case, or whether any deficiency caused prejudice.

Nor did it assess whether the IC’s findings were sustainable on the cumulative effect of the statements, electronic and audio material, correspondence, and party explanations.

The Tribunal also relied on a factual premise about the absence of a complaint after the first incident that was not supported by the record, which showed an email reporting it on 10 November 2021.

These deficiencies required a full appellate reassessment; the High Court considered that assessment should first be undertaken by the statutory Appellate Authority rather than substituted by the High Court.

It expressed no opinion on the merits and directed that the appeal be decided expeditiously, preferably within six months.

Gupta could raise his claim for arrears and other monetary benefits before the Appellate Authority.