Post-retirement disciplinary proceedings are void unless validly initiated under applicable service regulations before superannuation.

The appellant, a Senior Manager (MMG Grade III) of the respondent Bank, was due to superannuate on 31 October 2024.

On 28 October 2024, the Bank issued him a letter alleging irregularities in five loan accounts sanctioned by him.

After his retirement, the Bank served a charge memo dated 4 February 2025, followed by an order of punishment dated 13 March 2025 reducing his basic pay by one stage in the Officer Scale III time scale, while retaining certain increments, including up to the date of superannuation.

The appellant challenged the disciplinary action on the ground that the charge memo was issued after retirement and contrary to the Bangiya Gramin Vikas Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010.

The Single Judge declined interference, partly relying on the availability of an alternative appellate remedy.

Whether the Bank could initiate or continue disciplinary proceedings against the appellant after his superannuation on the basis of a charge memo issued on 4 February 2025, when no charge memo, minor-penalty notice, or suspension order had been issued before retirement?

Whether the letter dated 28 October 2024 constituted initiation of disciplinary proceedings under the 2010 Regulations?

Whether the existence of an alternative departmental appeal barred the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution where the disciplinary action was allegedly without jurisdiction?

The Court applied Regulations 39, 40 and 45 of the Bangiya Gramin Vikas Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010.

Regulation 39 requires a written notice stating the grounds of a proposed minor penalty and a reasonable opportunity to submit a defence; in the case of a major penalty, it requires written charges and an enquiry.

Regulation 45 permits disciplinary proceedings to continue after retirement only where the regulatory conditions for such continuation have been satisfied, including the officer being under suspension on a charge of misconduct and disciplinary proceedings having been initiated before superannuation.

The Court relied on CIC v. State of Manipur, (2011) 15 SCC 1, for the principle that where a statute prescribes a particular procedure, the authority must follow that procedure and cannot adopt another mode.

On alternative remedies, it applied Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2022) 16 SCC 428, read with Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 771, recognising that an alternative remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction.

It also relied on Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindranath Choubey, (2020) 18 SCC 71, for the principle that the applicable service rules determine whether disciplinary proceedings may be conducted after retirement.

The Court held that the letter dated 28 October 2024 was neither a charge memo for a major penalty nor the written notice required for imposing a minor penalty under Regulation 39.

The actual charge memo was issued only on 4 February 2025, approximately four months after the appellant’s retirement, and the Bank produced no suspension order issued before superannuation.

Since Regulation 45 permits post-retirement continuation only where the prescribed pre-retirement conditions are met, the Bank could not retrospectively treat the preliminary letter as initiation of a valid disciplinary proceeding.

The Court emphasised that the Bank was bound by the procedure prescribed in the 2010 Regulations and had no discretion to proceed outside it, irrespective of the minor nature of the punishment.

Because the action was wholly without jurisdiction and affected the appellant’s post-retiral dues, the existence of an alternative departmental appeal did not prevent the High Court from exercising jurisdiction under Article 226.

It held that the disciplinary action founded on the letter dated 28 October 2024 and the charge memo dated 4 February 2025 was without jurisdiction, as the regulatory requirements for initiating or continuing proceedings after retirement had not been satisfied.

The order of the Single Judge was set aside; the charge memo dated 4 February 2025 and the punishment order dated 13 March 2025 were quashed.

The writ petition was allowed, and the appellant was held entitled to consequential benefits arising from the quashing of those orders.

The pending application was disposed of.