Post-trial amendment seeking to alter the fundamental nature of the transaction and suit is impermissible.

The petitioner (original plaintiff) filed Special Civil Suit No. 336 of 2002 seeking recovery of money based on financial assistance allegedly provided directly to the respondent.

In 2016, 14 years after the suit's institution and after the commencement of trial (issues framed and evidence filed via affidavits), the petitioner moved an application (Exhibit ‘49’) under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC to amend the plaint.

The amendment sought to delete the original claim of direct payment and replace it with a claim that money was advanced to third parties on behalf of the defendant for share purchases.

The Trial Court rejected the application on 19.01.2018, leading to this petition under Article 227.

1. Whether the proposed amendment to the plaint, seeking to change the nature of the transaction after 14 years and post-commencement of trial, was permissible under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC.

2. Whether the High Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to interfere with the Trial Court’s discretionary order.

Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which governs the amendment of pleadings, emphasizing that amendments should not be granted after the trial has commenced unless "due diligence" is shown and that they should not alter the fundamental nature of the suit.

The principle from Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, which limits the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India to correcting grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse of law, rather than correcting every factual or legal error.

The court observed that the petitioner sought to replace a case of direct financial assistance with a completely different transaction involving payments to third parties (C.M. Singhi and Vinod Hingorani).

The court reasoned that since the trial had already progressed to the stage of witness affidavits, allowing such a radical change in the "nature of the suit" would be improper.

The court found that the facts sought to be introduced were within the petitioner’s knowledge from the suit’s inception in 2002; thus, there was no justification for a 14-year delay or for seeking to "fill up lacunae" after the trial started.

Applying the Garment Craft precedent, the Bench determined that the Trial Court's decision was neither perverse nor a miscarriage of justice.

It held that the amendment would significantly alter the nature of the suit at a belated stage and that there were no grounds to invoke extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.

The interim stay on the original suit proceedings was effectively vacated.