Predetermining guilt before considering representation against an enquiry report violates natural justice.

The petitioner, an Assistant Sub-Inspector serving under the Kamrup District Executive Force, was proceeded against departmentally following registration of ACB Police Station Case No. 84/2023 under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

It was alleged that, while investigating a criminal case, he demanded ₹6,000 from the wife of an accused for producing the case diary in bail proceedings and instructed another person to accept ₹3,000 as part-payment.

A departmental proceeding was initiated, with the statement of allegations, witness list and documents supplied to the petitioner, and an Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed.

The Enquiry Officer found the charges proved on the standard of preponderance of probabilities.

In the second and final show-cause notice dated 12 April 2024, the Disciplinary Authority stated that it agreed with the finding that the charges were proved and that the case was fit for major punishment, while inviting the petitioner’s explanation.

The petitioner’s explanation was rejected and he was dismissed from service on 31 July 2024. His statutory appeal was rejected on 7 December 2024.

1. Whether the second show-cause notice violated the principles of natural justice by recording a final conclusion that the charges were proved and that major punishment was warranted before considering the petitioner’s representation.

2. Whether the dismissal order and the appellate order were liable to be quashed on account of the defective decision-making process, notwithstanding the limited scope of judicial review over departmental findings.

3. Whether the matter should be remanded for fresh consideration from the stage of consideration of the enquiry report.

The Court applied the principles of natural justice, particularly the requirement that a delinquent employee must receive a meaningful and effective opportunity to represent against an enquiry report before the Disciplinary Authority reaches a final conclusion on guilt or punishment.

The Disciplinary Authority may consider the Enquiry Officer’s findings, but must do so with an open and unbiased mind and independently decide the matter after considering the employee’s representation.

The Court relied on Babulal Das v. State of Assam & Ors., 2004 (2) GLT 259, and Kandarpa Kumar Kalita v. UCO Bank & Ors., which emphasize that prior determination of guilt vitiates the disciplinary process.

It also recognized that departmental charges are assessed on the standard of preponderance of probabilities, as stated in Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598.

Although judicial review does not ordinarily permit re-appreciation of evidence or substitution of the Court’s conclusions for those of departmental authorities, as explained in Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364, and State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423, the Court may review procedural fairness and violations of natural justice.

The disciplinary authority’s power to impose major punishment was stated to arise under Rule 66 of the Assam Police Manual, Part III.

The Court examined the language of the second show-cause notice, particularly the statements: “I agree with the opinion of the Enquiry Officer that the Charges framed against you have been proved” and “I therefore, found it a fit case for awarding major punishment”.

It held that these were not tentative or prima facie observations but disclosed a concluded determination both on guilt and on the appropriate category of punishment before the petitioner’s explanation was considered.

The purpose of the representation was to enable the petitioner to challenge the findings, identify evidentiary or procedural infirmities, and persuade the Disciplinary Authority to take a different view.

Since the authority had already formed its opinion, the subsequent opportunity was reduced to an empty formality and was therefore ineffective.

The Court clarified that it was not re-assessing the evidence or questioning the standard of proof; the defect lay in the decision-making process itself.

The limited scope of review over departmental findings did not bar intervention where natural justice had been violated.

The Appellate Authority also failed to address this specific procedural defect.

The dismissal order dated 31 July 2024 and the appellate order dated 7 December 2024 were consequently quashed.

The petitioner was directed to be reinstated, subject to the final outcome of fresh departmental proceedings.

The matter was remanded to the Disciplinary Authority to recommence from the stage of consideration of the enquiry report, provide an effective opportunity for representation, and take an independent decision uninfluenced by the earlier notice, dismissal order or appellate order.

The Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the charges, directed completion of the exercise preferably within three months, and awarded consequential benefits subject to the final disciplinary decision.

The writ petition was allowed without costs.