Preliminary fact-finding inquiries require neither Chancellor’s approval nor a full departmental hearing.

The petitioner, Registrar of Hemchand Yadav University, Durg, challenged the initiation of an inquiry against him by order dated 29 July 2026 issued by the Assistant Registrar.

He contended that prior approval of the Chancellor, namely the Governor, was required under the applicable statutory provisions before initiating the inquiry, but had not been obtained.

He further alleged that the Inquiry Committee neither informed him of the proceedings nor afforded him an opportunity of hearing, and that it submitted its report on 31 July 2026 in violation of natural justice.

The State opposed the petition, characterising the proceedings as a preliminary fact-finding inquiry rather than a formal departmental inquiry, and argued that the report neither imposed a penalty nor caused any adverse civil consequence.

Upon examining Annexure P-1, the Court found that the proceedings were intended only to ascertain the factual position concerning the allegations against the petitioner.

1. Whether prior approval of the Chancellor was necessary before initiating the impugned preliminary fact-finding inquiry against the petitioner.

2. Whether the petitioner was entitled to a prior opportunity of hearing during the preliminary fact-finding inquiry and before submission of the Inquiry Committee’s report.

3. Whether the writ petition challenging the inquiry and report was premature and warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court applied the distinction between a preliminary fact-finding inquiry and a formal departmental inquiry.

Prior approval of the Chancellor, where required under the applicable statutory provisions, is necessary at the stage of initiating a formal departmental inquiry, but is not required for a preliminary inquiry conducted merely to ascertain facts.

A preliminary fact-finding report, which does not itself impose a penalty or produce an adverse civil consequence, does not ordinarily attract the full procedural safeguards applicable to a regular departmental inquiry, including a right of hearing as a matter of course.

The Court also applied the principle that a writ challenge is premature where the impugned preliminary proceedings do not themselves result in disciplinary action or adverse civil consequences.

The Court examined the nature and purpose of the proceedings rather than accepting the petitioner’s description of them as disciplinary proceedings.

Annexure P-1 demonstrated that the inquiry was limited to determining the factual position regarding the allegations and was not a formal departmental inquiry.

Since the Inquiry Committee’s report did not impose any penalty or independently create an adverse civil consequence, the statutory requirement of prior Chancellor approval applicable to formal departmental proceedings was held inapplicable at this stage.

For the same reason, the petitioner could not claim, as a matter of course, the procedural right to a hearing available in a regular departmental inquiry.

Any grievance concerning breach of natural justice or non-compliance with statutory requirements could arise for consideration if formal disciplinary proceedings were subsequently initiated on the basis of the report.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.

The Court clarified that if the respondents initiate formal departmental proceedings against the petitioner on the basis of the fact-finding report, they must strictly comply with the applicable statutory provisions and the principles of natural justice.