Presumption of age from birth certificates is rebuttable by credible, uncontroverted oral testimony of the child and parents.

The appellant was convicted by a Special Judge (POCSO) for penetrative sexual assault under Section 3(a) of the POCSO Act, Section 376(1) of the IPC, and Section 315 of the IPC.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant had a consensual sexual relationship with the victim on 13.06.2022, resulting in pregnancy, and subsequently provided her with drugs for an abortion.

The conviction under Section 315 IPC was set aside by the trial court, but the appellant was convicted for rape based on the victim’s alleged minority.

The birth certificate (Exbt-P3) produced by the prosecution recorded the date of birth as 05.01.2005, which would make the victim 17 years old at the time of the incident.

However, the victim and her mother provided conflicting testimonies during trial regarding her actual age.

1. Whether the prosecution successfully established that the victim was a "child" as defined under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act at the time of the incident.

2. Whether the conviction under Section 376(1) of the IPC can be sustained in light of the victim's admission of consensual sexual intercourse.

The Court applied Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act, 2012, which defines a child as a person below 18 years.

It relied on Section 13(3) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969, which mandates that a birth not registered within one year can only be registered via an order of a Magistrate of the First Class after verifying correctness.

The Court also applied the evidentiary principle that when two views are possible from conflicting prosecution evidence, the view favorable to the accused must be adopted.

Furthermore, for a conviction based primarily on a victim's testimony, the victim must satisfy the test of a "sterling witness".

The Court observed that the birth certificate (Exbt-P3) was issued on 05.04.2022, seventeen years after the alleged birth, without evidence of the mandatory Magisterial order required under Section 13(3) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act.

Consequently, the presumption of correctness of this public document was discarded.

This was exacerbated by internal contradictions: the victim herself testified she was born in 2004 (making her an adult), and her mother testified she was born in December 2004.

The prosecution failed to cross-examine its own witnesses on these points.

Regarding the IPC charge, while the sexual act was corroborated by medical evidence of pregnancy, the victim admitted in cross-examination that the act was entirely consensual.

Since the prosecution failed to prove the victim was a minor, the element of "lack of consent" required for a rape conviction under Section 375 of the IPC was missing.

Since the victim was an adult and the sexual intercourse was consensual, no offence under Section 376(1) of the IPC was made out.

The High Court set aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.07.2024, acquitted the appellant of all charges, and ordered his immediate release.