Presumption under Section 90 of Evidence Act is limited to execution, not proof of contents.

The Appellants (original plaintiffs) filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell executed on October 30, 1977, by the Respondents' father, Virupaksha Khalipe

They alleged that an earnest amount of Rs. 1,000/- was paid and possession was delivered

The Respondents (defendants) denied the execution, contending the land was 'Inam' land requiring Collector's permission and that no such agreement existed

The Trial Court decreed the suit in 2014, but the First Appellate Court reversed the decree in 2019, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the execution and their readiness/willingness

The Appellants challenged this reversal in a Second Appeal

1. Whether the plaintiffs proved the execution of the 1977 agreement by invoking the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act through the testimony of the scribe’s son

2. Whether the plaintiffs demonstrated continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract between 1977 and 2010

3. Whether any substantial question of law arose to warrant interference under Section 100 of the CPC

The Court applied Section 100 of the CPC, which restricts Second Appeals to "substantial questions of law," as interpreted in Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar

It applied Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, which allows a court to presume the genuineness of a 30-year-old document from proper custody, though this is a limited presumption as held in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, requiring separate proof of contents

It further considered Section 72 of the Evidence Act regarding the proof of attested documents not required by law to be attested

The High Court observed that the Appellants relied on Section 90 of the Evidence Act and the testimony of the scribe's son to prove the 1977 document. However, the Court noted that an attesting witness was alive during the trial but was not examined without sufficient explanation; identifying a signature through the witness's son was insufficient when the witness himself was available

Under Section 90, while the execution might be presumed, the contents must still be proved separately, which the Appellants failed to do

Regarding "readiness and willingness," the Court found a 33-year delay (1977 to 2010) in filing the suit. The Appellants failed to explain why their predecessors took no action during their lifetimes or why no notice was issued between 2000 and 2010

The Court concluded that the findings of the First Appellate Court were factual and did not suffer from perversity or illegality

The Court affirmed that the Trial Court erred in blindly invoking Section 90 when better evidence (the attesting witness) was available and that the long lapse of time negated the claim of readiness and willingness

The Second Appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of the First Appellate Court dismissing the suit was upheld