Preventive detention based on a single criminal case without evidence of a public order disturbance is unsustainable.

The petitioner, Ismailkhan Surtankhan Hamirkhan, was preventively detained by an order dated 02.02.2026 passed by the District Magistrate, Vav-Tharad.

He was classified as a "bootlegger" under Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act (PASA), 1985.

The detention was based on a single FIR registered on 14.09.2025 at Tharad Police Station for offences involving the Prohibition Act.

The petitioner challenged the legality of this detention, arguing that there was no material to show his actions disturbed public order or public health.

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of powers under the PASA Act, 1985 is sustainable in law when based on a single prohibition case.

2. Whether the activities of the detenue reached the threshold of being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" as defined under Section 3 of the Act.

The court applied Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "bootlegger" as one who contravenes the Prohibition Act.

It relied on Section 3 of the same Act regarding the maintenance of "public order."

The court further applied the constitutional principle from Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, establishing that preventive detention is an exception to Article 21 and must be used only in rare cases.

Finally, it followed Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala (AIR 2025 SC 2868) and Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana, which hold that ordinary criminal law (like cancellation of bail) should be exhausted before resorting to the extraordinary measure of preventive detention.

The court found that the detaining authority reached a subjective satisfaction that was not supported by sufficient evidence.

Specifically, the court noted that the detention was based on only one registered case.

Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the bench reasoned that the state failed to demonstrate how these specific prohibition-related activities had a bearing on "public order" as opposed to mere "law and order".

The court observed that the state should have moved for the cancellation of the petitioner's bail under ordinary criminal law if there were apprehensions of further offences, rather than circumventing standard procedures through preventive detention.

Consequently, the nexus between the petitioner's acts and the disturbance of public tranquility was found to be missing.

The court held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was not legal or valid as the material was insufficient to show an adverse effect on public order.

The court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case, and made the Rule absolute.