Preventive detention cannot be invoked based on criminal antecedents where ordinary penal laws suffice to maintain public order.

The petitioner, Divyang @ Nanu Virbahadur Rana, was preventively detained by an order dated 28.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Vadodara City.

He was classified as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA).

The detention order was based on three criminal cases registered against him between 06.11.2025 and 22.12.2025 involving offences under Sections 305A, 331(3)(4), 317(2), and 54 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

The detenue had already been granted bail by the concerned court in these cases before the detention order was executed.

The petitioner challenged the detention as a mechanical exercise of power lacking material evidence of a threat to public order.

Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority under the PASA Act, 1985 is sustainable in law, specifically regarding the subjective satisfaction that the detenue's activities prejudiced the maintenance of "public order".

The court applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or attempts offences under specific chapters of the IPC (now BNS) or Arms Act.

It relied on the principle established by the Supreme Court in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others (2025) that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and as an exception to Article 21.

Furthermore, the court applied the doctrine from Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana and Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, holding that if ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) provides sufficient remedy, extraordinary detention laws should not be circumvented to "clip the wings" of an accused.

The court analyzed whether the three cited criminal cases were sufficient to establish a nexus between the detenue's conduct and a breach of "public order" as opposed to mere "law and order".

The Court observed that the Detaining Authority wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner was a threat to public order solely based on those three instances.

Drawing from the precedent in Dhanya M., the court reasoned that because the detenue was already enlarged on bail by a competent court, the State should have moved for cancellation of bail under ordinary law if they perceived a threat, rather than resorting to preventive detention.

The court found that the alleged offences did not have a bearing on the maintenance of public order at large, rendering the detention order a mechanical exercise of power.

Consequently, the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was ruled illegal and invalid.

The Court allowed the petition, quashed the detention order dated 28.01.2026, and directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other case.