Preventive detention cannot be invoked for ordinary law and order offenses lacking impact on public order.

The petitioner, Shakil @ Khatki Ishakbhai Kureshi, was detained preventively by an order dated 24.12.2025 issued by the District Magistrate, Anand, under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 ("PASA Act").

The detaining authority classified him as a “cruel person” based on two criminal cases registered against him between May 2020 and May 2025 involving offenses under the BNS, IPC, Gujarat Animal Preservation Act, and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act.

The petitioner challenged the legality of this detention through his daughter, arguing that the offenses cited—for which he had already been granted bail—did not justify preventive detention as they did not disturb "public order".

Whether the activities of the detenue, as cited in the criminal cases, satisfy the legal threshold of being prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order" as required under the PASA Act.

Whether the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was legally sound or if the power of preventive detention was exercised mechanically without sufficient material.

The court primarily applied Section 2(bbb) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "cruel person" as one who habitually commits offenses under the Bombay Animal Preservation Act.

The bench further relied on the constitutional safeguards under Article 21 and the principle established by the Supreme Court in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which dictates that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and only when ordinary criminal law (such as seeking cancellation of bail) is insufficient to address the threat.

The court reasoned that the two registered criminal cases against the petitioner did not demonstrate any disturbance to "public order" or "public tranquility," but were rather matters within the scope of "law and order".

The court observed that the detaining authority reached a subjective satisfaction mechanically, failing to distinguish between ordinary criminal activity and those endangering the society at large.

Following the Supreme Court's guidance, the bench noted that since the petitioner was already granted bail in the underlying offenses, the State should have moved for cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law instead of resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention to "clip the wings" of the accused.

The Court quashed and set aside the detention order dated 24.12.2025 and directed that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case.

Rule was made absolute.