Preventive detention cannot be resorted to for ordinary law and order violations affecting only individual criminal liability.

The petitioner, Maheshbhai Vinodbhai Gohel, challenged a detention order dated 31.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Vadodara City.

The order was issued under Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA), based on a single criminal case registered against the petitioner on 10.11.2025 at Nandesari Police Station for alleged "bootlegging" offenses under the Prohibition Act.

The petitioner had already been granted regular bail by a competent court for the underlying offense.

At the time of the hearing, the petitioner was detained in Rajkot Jail.

1. Whether the detention order passed under the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law given the material available to the Detaining Authority.

2. Whether the activities of the petitioner as a "bootlegger" reached the threshold of being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" as opposed to mere "law and order".

The Court relied on Section 2(b) of the Gujarat PASA Act, 1985, which defines a "bootlegger".

Section 3 of the Gujarat PASA Act, 1985, empowers the state to detain persons to prevent activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

The Court strongly applied the constitutional principles under Articles 21 and 22(3)(b), emphasizing that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly.

The Court followed the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala (AIR 2025 SC 2868), Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, and Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana, which establish that preventive detention should not be used to circumvent ordinary criminal law or to "clip the wings" of an accused who has been granted bail.

The Court analyzed whether the Detaining Authority had sufficient material to reach a "subjective satisfaction" that the petitioner’s actions disturbed "public order" rather than just "law and order".

The Court observed that the case was based on a single FIR where the petitioner was already enlarged on bail.

It reasoned that the state should have moved for cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law if they perceived a threat, rather than resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention.

The Court concluded that the link between a single prohibition case and a threat to "public tranquility" or "public health" was not established, rendering the authority’s satisfaction mechanical and legally invalid.

The Court allowed the petition and quashed the detention order dated 31.01.2026.

It directed that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case.

Rule was made absolute.