Preventive detention cannot be sustained on isolated criminal cases without evidence of prejudice to public order.

The petitioner, classified as a "bootlegger," challenged a detention order dated 03.02.2026 issued by the Commissioner of Police, Surat City, under Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act (PASA), 1985.

The grounds for detention relied upon a single criminal case registered on 11.01.2026 involving offences under Sections 65(A)(E), 98(2), 116(B), and 81 of the Prohibition Act.

The petitioner had already been granted regular bail by a competent court for the said offence.

The petitioner contended that the detention order was passed mechanically without material evidence showing that his activities disturbed "public order" as opposed to mere "law and order".

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority under the provisions of the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law based on a single criminal case.

2. Whether the activities of the petitioner as a "bootlegger" reached the threshold of being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order".

The court applied Section 2(b) of the PASA Act, 1985, which defines a "bootlegger".

The court applied Section 3, which empowers detention to prevent activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

The court relied on the Supreme Court precedent *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others* (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which establishes that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and is an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution.

Furthermore, it applied the principle from *Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana* and *Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar*, holding that if a person is enlarged on bail, the State should ideally move for cancellation of bail rather than resorting to preventive detention unless the material strictly falls within the requirements of the detention law.

The Court evaluated whether the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction was legally sound.

It observed that the authority relied on a single prohibition case to conclude that the petitioner’s actions affected "public order".

The Court reasoned that such offences do not inherently have a bearing on the maintenance of public order but rather fall under the domain of ordinary "law and order".

Following the Supreme Court’s mandate, the Court noted that since the petitioner was already granted bail, the extraordinary measure of detention was a circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure.

The Court found that there was no specific material to indicate how public health, tranquility, or order was disturbed by the petitioner’s individual acts.

The Court held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was invalid as the materials were insufficient to prove a threat to "public order".

The Court directed that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case, and made the Rule absolute.