Preventive detention cannot be used to circumvent ordinary criminal law when activities do not affect public order.

The petitioner (detenue) was preventively detained by an order dated 21.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat City, labeling him a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 ("PASA Act").

The detention was based on two criminal cases registered against the petitioner between 14.08.2024 and 15.01.2026 involving various sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the Gujarat Police Act.

The petitioner had already been granted bail in these cases by the competent court.

The petitioner challenged the detention through his mother, arguing that the material relied upon did not demonstrate a disturbance of "public order".

Whether the activities of the detenue, based on the registered criminal cases, were prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order" under the PASA Act or merely related to "law and order".

Whether the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction was legally sustainable in light of the fact that the detenue was already granted bail in the predicate offenses.

The court primarily applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or attempts to commit specific offenses under the IPC/BNS.

It relied on the constitutional safeguards under Article 21 and Article 22(3)(b) regarding preventive detention as an extraordinary measure.

The court further applied the precedent set in *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala* (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which emphasizes that preventive detention must be used sparingly and is not a substitute for the ordinary criminal process.

Additionally, it followed *Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana* and *Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar*, establishing that if an accused is on bail, the state should seek cancellation of bail rather than resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention unless specific "public order" requirements are met.

The court reasoned that for a person to be detained as a "dangerous person," their activities must adversely affect the maintenance of "public order," which is distinct from a mere "law and order" problem.

Upon reviewing the two criminal cases cited, the court found that the material was insufficient to conclude that the detenue’s actions disturbed public tranquility or the society at large.

The court observed that the Detaining Authority failed to explain how the public health or order was threatened.

Furthermore, because the petitioner had been granted bail by a competent court, the High Court held that the state should have exercised caution; the use of preventive detention as a mechanical tool to "clip the wings" of an accused involved in criminal prosecution—without demonstrating why ordinary criminal law was insufficient—rendered the subjective satisfaction of the authority invalid.

The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned detention order dated 21.01.2026.

It directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case.

Rule was made absolute.