Preventive detention cannot replace bail cancellation, Karnataka HC orders release of detenu amid public-order and document-supply lapses

The petitioner, wife of the detenu Sanju Kadkol, challenged his preventive detention under Section 3 of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1985.

The detention order relied on four criminal cases: one ending in acquittal and three pending trial, in which the detenu had been released on bail.

It also referred to preventive proceedings, a rowdy sheet, alleged gang activity and asserted effects on public order.

The State had not sought cancellation of bail in the pending cases. The petitioner further contended that material relied upon for detention had not been furnished to the detenu.

The Advisory Board had rejected his request for release

1. Whether preventive detention could be used as an alternative to seeking cancellation of bail in the pending criminal cases

2. Whether the material relied upon established a threat to public order, rather than a law-and-order problem

3. Whether non-supply of material relied upon by the detaining authority violated Article 22(5) of the Constitution

Article 22(5) of the Constitution requires the grounds of detention and relied-upon documents to be communicated in time to enable an effective representation; failure to supply material relied upon may vitiate detention (Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India, (2024) 9 SCC 53)

Under Sections 3 and 2(a) of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1985, preventive detention requires conduct prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, not merely a breach of law and order; the impact must extend to the community or public at large (Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740; Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 415)

Preventive detention should not ordinarily substitute for seeking cancellation of bail where ordinary criminal law provides a remedy (Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587; Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, (2024) 17 SCC 294).

The power is exceptional and must be strictly exercised.

The Court found that the detenu was on bail in the three pending cases, yet the State had not applied to cancel bail; nor was there a non-bailable warrant or identified breach of bail conditions. The detention therefore could not be used as a substitute for remedies under ordinary criminal law.

Although the detention grounds described serious alleged conduct, including organised robbery and conspiracy, the order’s general assertions of fear and insecurity did not adequately demonstrate how the detenu’s acts affected public order or the even tempo of community life. Preventive proceedings and rowdy-sheet history did not, without sufficient supporting material, establish that threshold.

Further, the material relied upon in forming the detaining authority’s satisfaction had not been supplied to the detenu, impairing his constitutional opportunity to make an effective representation.

It quashed the detention order dated 6 July 2026 and the subsequent orders dated 16 July and 18 August 2026, and issued a writ of habeas corpus directing the detenu’s release forthwith, unless he was required in another case.