Preventive detention cannot rest on stale criminal antecedents absent a live and proximate link to present prejudicial activity.

The petitioner challenged Detention Order No. DMS/PSA/07/2025 dated 29 April 2025, issued by the District Magistrate, Srinagar under Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (“PSA”), directing his preventive detention on the ground that his activities were prejudicial to the security of the State.

The detention was executed on 3 May 2025.

The principal material relied upon was FIR No. 53/2022, registered at Police Station Saddar under Sections 121 and 121-A IPC and Sections 16, 17, 18 and 40 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act; the petitioner had already been granted bail in that case.

The petitioner contended that the reliance on the 2022 FIR was stale, that no proximate intervening prejudicial activity was disclosed, and that the detaining authority had failed to demonstrate independent application of mind or the necessity of preventive detention despite the grant of bail.

The respondents asserted that the detaining authority had considered the relevant material, including the petitioner’s alleged continuous involvement in anti-national and unlawful activities and his being bound down under Sections 126/170 BNSS.

The Court also noted that the respondents had not produced material demonstrating that the petitioner’s case was referred to the Advisory Board within the period prescribed by Section 15 PSA.

Whether reliance on FIR No. 53/2022, without disclosure of proximate intervening prejudicial activity, established a live and proximate link justifying preventive detention in 2025?

Whether the detaining authority adequately considered the petitioner’s release on bail and demonstrated a real necessity for preventive detention despite the availability of ordinary criminal law?

Whether the detention order reflected independent and conscious application of mind rather than mechanical reliance on the police dossier?

Whether non-demonstration of a timely reference to the Advisory Board under Section 15 PSA vitiated the continued detention?

The Court applied Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, governing preventive detention; Sections 15–17 PSA, which provide for reference of the detention case to the Advisory Board, the Board’s consideration, and the Government’s consequential action; and the constitutional protection of personal liberty under Article 21.

It held that preventive detention is preventive, not punitive, and that the material relied upon must have a live and proximate nexus with the purpose of detention.

Relying on Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244, and Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana, (2018) 12 SCC 150, the Court reiterated that stale incidents ordinarily cannot sustain preventive detention absent circumstances demonstrating continuity and proximity.

Where a person has been released on bail, the detaining authority must consciously consider that circumstance and identify cogent material showing a real possibility of future prejudicial conduct.

The grounds of detention must also disclose independent application of mind and cannot merely reproduce the police dossier.

The Court further treated reference to the Advisory Board under Section 15 PSA as a mandatory statutory safeguard.

The Court found a substantial temporal gap between the 2022 FIR and the detention order passed in 2025, with no sufficiently proximate intervening prejudicial activity disclosed to bridge that gap or establish a live link.

The petitioner’s antecedents, by themselves, could not convert stale material into proximate material warranting preventive detention.

Although the petitioner had been released on bail, the detention order did not satisfactorily identify any subsequent breach of bail conditions, fresh prejudicial activity, or other compelling circumstance showing that ordinary criminal law had become insufficient.

The reliance on the old FIR, coupled with the failure to account for the intervening period and the grant of bail, also undermined the claim that the detaining authority had independently and consciously reached the requisite subjective satisfaction.

Independently, the respondents failed to produce material showing that the petitioner’s case had been referred to the Advisory Board within the period prescribed by Section 15 PSA, constituting a serious statutory infirmity in the continued detention.

The petition was allowed, Detention Order No. DMS/PSA/07/2025 dated 29 April 2025 was quashed, and the respondents were directed to release the petitioner forthwith, unless his custody was required in connection with any other case.