Preventive detention is impermissible when criminal activities fail to disturb public order or bypass ordinary penal remedies.

The petitioner (the detenue), Akash Pappubhai Rajbhar, was preventively detained following an order dated 29.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat City.

The detention was based on two criminal cases registered against him under Sections 115(2), 125(a), 352, 351(3), 296(b), and 54 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 135 of the G.P. Act.

The authority classified him as a "dangerous person" under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities (PASA) Act, 1985, asserting that his activities prejudiced "public order".

The petitioner challenged this order via a writ of habeas corpus through his mother, noting that he had already been granted bail in the underlying criminal cases.

Whether the activities of the detenue, based on the registered FIRs, were sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of affecting "public order" under the Act of 1985.

Whether the Detaining Authority properly exercised its subjective satisfaction or erroneously resorted to preventive detention as a substitute for ordinary criminal law.

The court applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as a habitual offender committing specific IPC/BNS offences.

It relied on the constitutional principle from *Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu*, emphasizing that preventive detention is an exception to Article 21 and must be used sparingly.

Furthermore, it followed *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala* [AIR 2025 SC 2868] and *Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana*, which establish that if ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) provides sufficient means to address the state's apprehensions, extraordinary laws of preventive detention should not be invoked.

The "public order" vs. "law and order" distinction remained central to the assessment.

The Court observed that the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction was flawed because the two cited criminal cases did not demonstrate a disturbance of "public order," but were rather matters of "law and order".

The Court reasoned that since the detenue had been granted bail by competent courts, the State should have moved for the cancellation of that bail if it perceived a continued threat, rather than bypassing the judicial process through preventive detention.

Citing *Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar*, the Court noted that preventive detention cannot be used merely to "clip the wings" of an accused participating in a criminal trial.

Consequently, the Court found there was no material on record to indicate that the detenue’s actions had a bearing on the maintenance of public tranquility or health at large.

The petition was allowed, and the detention order dated 29.01.2026 was quashed.

The Court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case.