Preventive detention is unsustainable when criminal activities do not disturb public order or bypass ordinary penal remedies.

The petitioner, Salimbhai Ishakbhai Sumbhaniya, was preventively detained by an order dated 06.01.2026 passed by the District Magistrate, Devbhumi Dwarka.

The authority classified him as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act (PASA), 1985, based on two criminal cases registered against him involving the Animal Preservation Act and the Gujarat Police Act.

The petitioner challenged the legality of this detention, arguing that the activities mentioned did not disturb "public order" and that the detaining authority failed to apply its mind, especially since the petitioner had already been granted bail in the underlying criminal cases.

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority under the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law based on the provided material.

2. Whether the alleged criminal activities of the petitioner constitute a threat to "public order" as opposed to a mere "law and order" issue.

The Court applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or abets specific IPC offences over three successive years.

It further relied on the constitutional protections under Article 21 and Article 22(3)(b) as interpreted in *Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu*, highlighting that preventive detention is an exceptional power.

Most significantly, the Court applied the precedent from *Dhaya M. v. State of Kerala and others* (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which mandates that the State should seek cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law rather than resorting to preventive detention unless absolutely necessary for maintaining public order.

The Court observed that the detention order was based on two specific cases related to animal preservation and police act violations, for which the petitioner had already secured bail.

It reasoned that the authority failed to demonstrate how these specific acts disturbed "public order" or "public tranquility" as required by the Act.

Following the Supreme Court's guidance, the Court noted that the law of preventive detention is a "hard law" and must be strictly construed; it cannot be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal procedure or to "clip the wings" of an accused when the State fails to challenge bail orders.

The Court found that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was flawed because the underlying offences did not have a nexus with the maintenance of public order.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the petition, quashed the detention order dated 06.01.2026, and directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case.