Preventive detention lacks legal sustainability if alleged bootlegging activities fail to demonstrate disturbance of public order.

The petitioner, Manoj @ Alpesh Pravinbhai Thakor, was detained pursuant to an order dated 23.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Vadodara City, under Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act (PASA), 1985.

The detention was based on a single criminal case registered against him on 29.11.2025 under Sections 65(A)(E) and 116(B) of the Prohibition Act at Kapurai Police Station.

The petitioner had already been granted regular bail by the concerned court for this offense.

At the time of the hearing, the petitioner was held in Jamnagar Jail.

1. Whether the detention order passed under the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law given the material available to the detaining authority.

2. Whether the activities of the petitioner as a recorded "bootlegger" adversely affected the maintenance of "public order" as opposed to "law and order".

The court applied Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "bootlegger".

Section 3, which empowers the state to detain such persons to maintain public order.

The court relied on the constitutional safeguards under Articles 226 and 227.

It followed the precedent set by the Apex Court in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others (2025), which dictates that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly as an exception to Article 21 and only in rare cases, rather than as a substitute for ordinary criminal law or for "clipping the wings" of an accused released on bail.

The Court observed that the detaining authority reached its subjective satisfaction regarding the threat to "public order" based solely on a single prohibition case.

The Court reasoned that for an act to qualify as a disturbance to "public order," it must affect the community at large, whereas the charged offense did not demonstrate such a wide-reaching impact.

Relying on Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court noted that since the petitioner had been granted regular bail, the State's appropriate remedy was to move for cancellation of bail if they feared further offenses, rather than resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention.

The Court found that the authority failed to show how the petitioner's activities disturbed public health or tranquility, rendering the detention order mechanical and without proper application of mind.

The Court held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was not legal or valid as the material on record did not establish a threat to the maintenance of public order.

The Court directed that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other legal matter.

Under Section 2(b) and Section 3 of the Act, mere involvement in a prohibition case does not automatically justify preventive detention without a proven nexus to the disruption of public order.