Preventive detention order is unsustainable if criminal activities do not adversely affect maintenance of public order.

The petitioner (detenue) was preventively detained by an order dated 23/01/2026 passed by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad, under Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA).

The detention was based on the detenue’s involvement in two criminal cases registered between 17/12/2025 and 13/01/2026 under Sections 303(2) and 54 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.

The Detaining Authority classified the petitioner as a “dangerous person” whose activities were prejudicial to "public order".

The petitioner challenged the detention through his uncle, arguing that the incidents cited did not disturb public order and that the order was passed mechanically without application of mind.

1. Whether the activities of the detenue, based on the registered FIRs, were sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" under the PASA Act.

2. Whether the Detaining Authority’s subjective satisfaction in passing the detention order was legally sustainable when the detenue had already been granted bail in the underlying criminal cases.

The court applied Section 2(c) of the PASA Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as a habitual offender committing specified offences under the IPC (now BNS) or Arms Act.

It relied on the constitutional principle that preventive detention is an extraordinary power and an exception to Article 21, as established in *Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu*.

Furthermore, it applied the doctrine from *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala* (AIR 2025 SC 2868) and *Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana*, which mandates that the state should seek cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law rather than resorting to preventive detention unless the activities specifically impact "public order" as opposed to mere "law and order".

The Court observed that the detention was based solely on two pending criminal cases where the petitioner had already been granted bail by competent courts.

The bench held that the Detaining Authority failed to demonstrate how these specific offences had any bearing on the maintenance of "public order" or how they disturbed the even tempo of life for the community at large.

Relying on Apex Court precedents, the Court reasoned that the law of preventive detention is a "hard law" and must be strictly construed; it cannot be used "to clip the wings of an accused" or circumvent ordinary criminal procedure when the state fails to challenge bail orders.

Consequently, the court found the subjective satisfaction of the authority to be flawed as the material on record only indicated a potential "law and order" problem, not a "public order" threat.

The High Court quashed the detention order dated 23/01/2026 and directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case.

Rule was made absolute.