Preventive detention order quashed for failure to demonstrate nexus between criminal cases and disruption of public order.

The petitioner challenged a detention order dated 27.01.2026 passed by the District Magistrate, Surat, under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA).

The detenue was classified as a "dangerous person" based on three criminal cases registered between October and November 2025 involving the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the Electricity Act.

The petitioner was subsequently detained in Central Jail, Vadodara.

The petitioner contended that the crimes cited did not disturb public order and that the order was passed mechanically.

Whether the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority—that the detenue's activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order"—was legally sustainable based on the material provided.

Whether the state should have resorted to preventive detention when the detenue had already been granted bail in the underlying criminal cases.

The court applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as a habitual offender committing specific IPC/BNS offences.

It relied on the constitutional principle that preventive detention is an extraordinary power and an exception to Article 21, as established in *Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu*.

Furthermore, it applied the precedent from *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala* (2025) and *Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana*, which mandates that the state should seek cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law rather than resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention unless public order is genuinely jeopardized.

The Court examined the three criminal cases and determined they did not have a sufficient nexus to the "maintenance of public order," as distinguished from mere "law and order" issues.

The Court reasoned that since the detenue had been granted bail by competent courts for the cited offences, the Detaining Authority failed to show why ordinary criminal law was insufficient to address the state's apprehensions.

Citing Supreme Court precedents, the Bench observed that the law of preventive detention must be strictly construed and should not be used to "clip the wings" of an accused who is already being prosecuted under ordinary law.

Consequently, the authority's subjective satisfaction was deemed to be reached without proper application of mind.

The High Court allowed the petition, quashed the detention order dated 27.01.2026, and directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case.

Rule made absolute.