### Preventive detention under PASA Act unsustainable solely on criminal cases not affecting public order.

The petitioner, Soyebali Suleman Aalisar, was preventively detained by an order dated 27.01.2026 passed by the District Magistrate, Surat, under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA).

The detaining authority classified him as a "dangerous person" based on three criminal cases registered against him between October and November 2025 involving the BNS (Sections 303(2), 317(2), and 54) and the Electricity Act.

The petitioner, who had already been granted bail in these cases by the competent court, challenged the detention order through a friend, claiming it was passed mechanically without evidence that his actions disturbed public order.

1. Whether the detention order passed by the Detaining Authority under the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law given the material on record.

2. Whether the activities of the detenue, based on three criminal cases, satisfy the legal threshold of being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" as opposed to mere "law and order" issues.

The court primarily applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or attempts to commit specified offenses under the IPC/BNS or Arms Act.

It further relied on the constitutional principles of Article 21 and Article 22(3)(b) as interpreted in *Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu*, emphasizing that preventive detention is an extraordinary measure to be used only in rare cases.

The court also applied the precedent from *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala* (2025) and *Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana*, which establish that the State should seek cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law rather than resorting to preventive detention unless there is a specific threat to "public order".

The Court examined whether the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate was legally sound.

It observed that the authority relied on three specific criminal cases to label the petitioner a "dangerous person" whose activities affected public order.

However, the Court reasoned that these offenses were insufficient to establish a disturbance of "public order" or "public tranquility".

Relying on Apex Court precedents, the Court noted that since the petitioner was already enlarged on bail by a competent court, the State should have moved for the cancellation of bail under ordinary law if it perceived a threat, rather than using the "hard law" of preventive detention to "clip the wings" of the accused.

The court found that the nexus between the alleged activities and the maintenance of public order was not established, rendering the satisfaction of the detaining authority invalid.

Consequently, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the authority was held to be illegal and not in accordance with the law.

The Court allowed the petition, quashed the detention order and grounds dated 27.01.2026, and directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith.