Prima facie allegations of rape induced by false promise to marry warrant trial, not quashing.

Respondent No. 2, a married woman with two children, alleged that the petitioner enticed and threatened her with a promise of marriage, took her to his residence, confined her for approximately 15 days, and repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her against her will and on the basis of a false promise of marriage.

She further alleged that the petitioner threatened and abused her when she demanded marriage.

Her complaint was forwarded for registration of Howly P.S. Case No. 204/2023 under Sections 120(B), 420, 294, 354, 376 and 506 IPC.

After investigation, the police submitted Charge Sheet No. 03/2024 dated 28 January 2024 against the petitioner under Sections 120(B), 420 and 376 IPC, showing him as an absconder.

The JMFC, Barpeta, thereafter took cognizance in PRC Case No. 407/2024 on 26 April 2024.

The petitioner invoked Section 528 BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, seeking quashing of the charge sheet and cognizance order, contending that the relationship was consensual, that no false promise of marriage was legally possible because the complainant was already married, and that Section 120(B) could not apply where he alone had been charge-sheeted.

1. Whether the allegations in the complaint/FIR and the materials collected during investigation disclosed a prima facie case under Sections 376, 420 and 120(B) IPC warranting continuation of the criminal proceedings.

2. Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS to quash the charge sheet and the order taking cognizance at the pre-charge stage.

3. Whether the petitioner’s assertions of consensual sexual relations, absence of a false promise, and the alleged defect in the charge under Section 120(B) justified quashing instead of being considered at trial or at the stage of framing of charge.

The Court applied Section 528 BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, which permits quashing of criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice, but requires cautious and exceptional exercise of jurisdiction.

It relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, particularly the categories permitting quashing where the allegations, even if accepted at face value, do not disclose an offence, are inherently improbable, or are manifestly mala fide.

The Court also applied the principle that, at the stage of cognizance or issuance of process, the court need only determine whether a prima facie case exists and must not conduct a mini-trial or assess the ultimate reliability of the evidence, as stated in Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 690.

On consensual sex and false promise of marriage, the Court considered Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191, and related authorities, which distinguish a false promise made without intention to marry from a subsequent breach of a genuine promise.

The Court held that the FIR and investigation materials, taken at face value, alleged more than a consensual relationship: they included threats, confinement for 15 days, repeated sexual intercourse, and consent allegedly obtained under a misconception arising from a false promise of marriage.

Although the complainant was married, that circumstance did not, at the quashing stage, conclusively negate the allegation that the petitioner promised to marry her or that her consent was influenced by that promise.

Whether the petitioner genuinely intended to marry her or made the promise merely to induce sexual relations was a factual question requiring evidence and could not be determined in proceedings under Section 528 BNSS.

The Court further held that the petitioner’s assertions regarding consent, the absence of deception, and the applicability of Section 120(B) involved disputed factual and legal matters that could be raised at the stage of framing of charge or during trial.

Since the charge had not yet been framed, the cognizance order did not finally determine the precise offences for which charges would be framed.

The case therefore did not fall within any of the Bhajan Lal categories warranting quashing.

It found that the complaint/FIR disclosed a prima facie case and that the disputed allegations could not be adjudicated through a mini-trial under Section 528 BNSS.

The petition was dismissed, and PRC Case No. 407/2024 pending before the JMFC, Barpeta, together with Charge Sheet No. 03/2024 dated 28 January 2024 under Sections 120(B), 420 and 376 IPC, was not quashed.