Principle of 'No Work No Pay' applies to salary claims following retrospective alteration of date of birth.

The appellant was appointed as a Teacher on 01.07.2004. In 2008, he sought to alter his recorded date of birth from 14.03.1965 to 14.03.1966.

The Writ Court accepted the corrected date of birth (14.03.1966) but declined to grant backdated wages.

The appellant reached the age of superannuation on 31.03.2026 and served until the end of the academic year on 31.05.2026, receiving full salary for that period.

The appellant filed this intra-court appeal seeking salary for the additional period he would have technically been in service based on the corrected date.

1. Whether an employee is entitled to wages for a period during which no actual service was rendered, following a judicial correction of the date of birth in service records.

The Court primarily applied the service law principle of "No Work No Pay".

The Court further relied on the principle of equity, holding that payment of salary from the State Exchequer for a period of non-service would result in "unjust gain" to the individual and "financial loss" to the public treasury.

The Court observed that while the appellant’s date of birth was corrected to 14.03.1966, he had already attained superannuation and completed his extended service until 31.05.2026.

The Court reasoned that the appellant had been duly paid for the entire duration he actually served as a Teacher. By applying the "No Work No Pay" doctrine, the Court determined that the appellant could not claim monetary benefits for a theoretical period of service he did not perform.

To grant such a claim would be a drain on the State Exchequer without corresponding labor, which the Court deemed legally unsustainable.

The Court found no infirmity in the Writ Court's order and dismissed the Writ Appeal and connected miscellaneous petitions.

No order as to costs was made.