Proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act remain maintainable despite concurrent Senior Citizens Act proceedings.

Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 married on 21 February 1988 through a Nikah ceremony in Mumbai.

Respondent No. 2 instituted proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”), alleging domestic violence, including economic abuse, cessation of maintenance and household expenses, non-payment of society charges and municipal taxes, and apprehended alienation of the Powai flat in which she and her son had resided for approximately 13 years.

The Petitioners approached the Bombay High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 / Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of Complaint Case No. 333/DV/2025 pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, 66th Court, Andheri, Mumbai.

Whether the allegations in the DV complaint, taken at their face value, disclosed a prima facie case of domestic violence warranting continuation of the proceedings.

Whether the pendency of proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act rendered the DV proceedings legally non-maintainable or otherwise barred their continuation.

Whether the DV proceedings were liable to be quashed on the ground that Respondent No. 2 had suppressed material facts or had instituted them for the purpose of claiming title to the Powai property.

Whether the case satisfied the parameters for exercise of the High Court’s quashing jurisdiction under State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal.

Sections 2(a), 2(f) and 2(s) of the DV Act define an “aggrieved person,” “domestic relationship” and “shared household,” respectively; a shared household includes a residence where the aggrieved person has lived in a domestic relationship, irrespective of the parties’ title or ownership rights.

Section 3 of the DV Act adopts a broad definition of domestic violence, including economic abuse such as deprivation of maintenance, household necessities, rental payments, and continued access to resources or the shared household.

The Court applied the quashing principles in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, under which proceedings may be quashed in illustrative categories such as where the allegations disclose no offence, are inherently absurd, are barred by law, or are manifestly mala fide.

It further relied on S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru, (2021) 15 SCC 730, which held that the Senior Citizens Act and the DV Act must be harmoniously construed; proceedings or eviction remedies under the Senior Citizens Act cannot automatically override a woman’s competing right to reside in a shared household or obtain remedies under the DV Act.

Section 26 of the DV Act permits reliefs under Sections 18–22 to be sought in other legal proceedings, subject to disclosure of relief already obtained.

The Court held that the complaint contained sufficient prima facie allegations of a domestic relationship and shared household: Respondent No. 2 asserted a marital relationship with Petitioner No. 1, long-term residence in the Powai flat, and continuing economic deprivation and threatened dispossession.

Since the statutory definitions do not make ownership or title a prerequisite, the allegations were capable of attracting the DV Act, particularly its provisions concerning economic abuse and residence-related protection.

The Court rejected the argument that Senior Citizens Act proceedings excluded the DV remedy.

Relying on S. Vanitha, it held that the two special enactments serve distinct but potentially overlapping protective purposes, and that the Senior Citizens Act cannot be used to nullify the statutory protection available to a woman in respect of a shared household.

The alleged suppression was also not established at the threshold because the Senior Citizens Act proceedings had expressly been mentioned in the DV complaint.

Further, the reliefs sought under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the DV Act were not confined to determination of title to the property.

Consequently, none of the Bhajan Lal categories was satisfied.

The allegations of suppression and an ulterior title-related purpose were insufficient to justify quashing at the preliminary stage.

Finding no ground under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution, Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or Section 528 of the BNSS, the Court dismissed the writ petition and declined to quash Complaint Case No. 333/DV/2025.