Professional negligence allegations against counsel are insufficient for condonation of gross delay without factual substantiation.

The Appellants (Sellers) entered into Agreements to Sell property in Amar Colony with the Respondents (Purchasers) in 2010 and 2011.

Following a Suit for Specific Performance, an ex-parte judgment and decree were passed against the Appellants on 30.07.2016.

Execution petitions were filed in 2017.

During execution proceedings on 08.08.2018, Appellant Rakesh Kapoor (also acting as POA for Veena Khanna) appeared in person and stated he was willing to execute the sale deeds upon receipt of the balance consideration, subsequently withdrawing an application filed under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex-parte decree.

After years of further litigation in the execution stage—including the dismissal of objections in 2022 and the withdrawal of two CM(Main) petitions in 2023—the Appellants filed these Regular First Appeals (RFAs) with a delay of 6 years and 9 months.

1. Whether the Appellants have shown "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 6 years and 9 months in filing the appeals

2. Whether the alleged professional negligence of previous counsels constitutes a valid ground for condonation of delay in light of the Appellants' conduct

3. Whether the impugned ex-parte judgment dated 30.07.2016 is a nullity for failing to specify a timeframe for the payment of balance consideration under Order XX Rule 12A CPC

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which requires the applicant to demonstrate "sufficient cause" for delay.

Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, establishing that while a counsel’s mistake can sometimes be sufficient cause, it is not an absolute rule.

Order XX Rule 12A of the CPC and Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, regarding the mandatory inclusion of payment timelines in specific performance decrees.

Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule to distinguish between "void" and "wrongful" decrees, holding that only a lack of inherent jurisdiction renders a decree a non-est nullity.

The Court rejected the Appellants' plea that the delay was due to the negligence of Advocate Vivek Sharma, noting that the Appellants were represented by multiple counsels (including Mr. S.S. Tyagi) since 2017.

The record revealed that Rakesh Kapoor voluntarily withdrew his application to set aside the ex-parte decree in 2018 and expressed willingness to execute the sale deed, indicating a "conscious decision" not to challenge the judgment at that time.

The Court observed that the Appellants suppressed the fact that they had filed and withdrawn CM(Main) petitions through their current counsel before filing these RFAs.

Regarding the "nullity" argument, the Court found that the 2016 judgment did specify a two-month period for execution, which inherently required the payment of the balance consideration.

Since the Trial Court had competent jurisdiction, the decree was not void ab-initio.

The Court dismissed CM APPL. 33374/2023 and CM APPL. 35537/2023 (Condonation of Delay). Consequently, RFA 488/2023 and RFA 545/2023 were dismissed as time-barred.