Prolonged consensual cohabitation by a mature adult does not constitute rape under false promise of marriage.

The appellant/prosecutrix challenged the judgment dated 21.02.2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Sakti, which acquitted Respondent No. 1 of charges under Sections 376(2)(n) and 417 of the IPC.

The prosecutrix alleged that in 2014, the respondent induced her into a physical relationship under a pretext of marriage, subsequently cohabiting with her for seven years in various locations.

She further alleged that the respondent abandoned her on 20.08.2021.

A written report was lodged on 09.11.2021, resulting in a delay of approximately 2 months and 18 days.

During cross-examination, the prosecutrix admitted she was a mature, educated adult (aged 23 at the start of the relationship) who voluntarily lived with the respondent and did not raise any alarm or seek legal recourse during the seven-year cohabitation.

1. Whether the physical relationship between the parties was consensual or vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising from a false promise of marriage under Section 90 of the IPC.

2. Whether the trial court’s judgment of acquittal was perverse or legally unsustainable, warranting interference by the appellate court.

The court primarily applied Section 376(2)(n) (rape on the same woman repeatedly) and Section 417 (cheating) of the IPC.

It relied on Section 90 of the IPC, which stipulates that consent given under a "misconception of fact" is not valid consent.

The court cited Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, establishing that a promise of marriage must be shown to be false from its inception—given in bad faith with no intention to adhere to it—to constitute a misconception of fact.

Furthermore, it applied the principles from Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana and Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) regarding the distinction between a mere "breach of promise" and a "false promise".

Finally, the court invoked the doctrine from Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, which dictates that if the trial court's view is "legally plausible," the appellate court should not reverse an acquittal even if a contrary view is possible.

The Court observed that the prosecutrix was a mature, educated adult who engaged in a long-term consensual relationship spanning seven years.

It noted that "consent" under Section 375 involves active and reasoned deliberation, and the seven-year duration of cohabitation strongly indicated a consensual nature rather than one obtained through deceit.

The Court highlighted that the prosecutrix admitted to not making any complaints despite multiple opportunities and living in inhabited colonies.

Medical evidence (PW-9) supported this, as no signs of force or coercion were found.

The Court reasoned that for a conviction, there must be evidence that the accused had no intention of marrying the victim from the very beginning.

The failure to prove such mala fide intent at the initial stage, combined with the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, led the Court to determine that the relationship was a result of mutual love and passion rather than a fraudulent misconception.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, as the relationship was clearly consensual and did not fall within the ambit of "misconception of fact" under Section 90 of the IPC.

The Court concluded that the trial court's findings were a "plausible and possible view" and lacked any patent illegality or perversity that would justify appellate interference.