Prolonged inaction and inadequate explanation do not constitute sufficient cause for condoning inordinate delay.

The appellant filed a writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, challenging the order dated 30 November 2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 7098 of 2011.

The appeal was filed with an application, I.A. No. 11117 of 2024, seeking condonation of delay.

According to the Registry, the appeal was delayed by 2,445 days.

The appellant asserted that, after contacting his counsel in June 2018, the appeal was prepared and entrusted to the counsel’s clerk for filing.

The clerk allegedly failed to file it and subsequently died on 22 December 2021.

The appellant further relied on the Supreme Court’s COVID-19 limitation orders and stated that he discovered the non-filing of the appeal only after contacting his counsel on 25 October 2024.

The respondents opposed the application.

Whether the appellant had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the delay of 2,445 days in filing the writ appeal?

Whether the appellant could rely on the entrustment of the appeal to the advocate’s clerk and the COVID-19 limitation exclusion orders to explain the entire period of delay?

The Court applied Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, under which the writ appeal was filed.

It applied the settled principle that delay may be condoned only upon a bona fide and satisfactory demonstration of “sufficient cause,” and that the applicant must explain the relevant period of inaction.

Relying on H. Guruswamy & Others v. A. Krishaiah, since deceased by LRs, Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2025, decided on 8 January 2025, the Court reiterated that liberal or justice-oriented considerations cannot be used to defeat the law of limitation; the length of delay is relevant, the applicant’s bona fides must first be examined, and substantial justice cannot automatically override unexplained prolonged inaction.

The Court also recognized that the Supreme Court’s COVID-19 orders permit exclusion of the specified pandemic period, but do not independently explain delay occurring before or after that period.

The Court found the explanation inadequate and indicative of prolonged inaction.

The order under challenge had been passed in the presence of the appellant’s counsel, and the appellant admittedly approached counsel in June 2018.

Even assuming that the appeal was prepared and handed to the clerk, the appellant did not make any effort to verify its filing for several years, including after the clerk’s death on 22 December 2021.

The Court further held that the assertion regarding entrustment to the clerk was not satisfactory because an appeal is required to be presented by counsel, who must also sign the order sheet at the time of filing.

The COVID-19 exclusion could not account for the substantial unexplained delay outside the pandemic period.

Applying the principles in H. Guruswamy, the Court concluded that the delay was not sufficiently or bona fide explained and that the merits of the appeal could not be considered in the absence of sufficient cause.

Accordingly, I.A. No. 11117 of 2024 was rejected, and, as a consequence, Writ Appeal No. 2681 of 2024 was dismissed as barred by limitation.