Prolonged separation and marital alienation, cumulatively, established cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia).

The parties married on 30 April 2001 and have two children. The wife petitioned under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”), alleging cruelty and desertion.

The Family Court dismissed the petition, finding that cruelty had not been proved and that the wife had voluntarily left the matrimonial residence.

On appeal, the wife challenged that decision, relying, among other matters, on the parties’ prolonged separation and the husband’s allegation of an extra-marital relationship, which he denied in cross-examination.

The High Court noted that the parties had lived separately since at least 2015, without resuming matrimonial life.

Whether the wife established cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA, having regard to the prolonged separation and the parties’ circumstances cumulatively.

Whether the wife established desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) HMA.

Section 13(1)(ia) HMA permits dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty; Section 13(1)(ib) provides desertion as a separate statutory ground.

In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, the Supreme Court identified prolonged continuous separation as a circumstance that may indicate that a matrimonial bond is beyond repair and may lead to mental cruelty.

In Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, the Supreme Court stated that an appellate court may consider prolonged separation, absence of genuine reconciliation efforts, cessation of cohabitation and emotional alienation as indicators of mental cruelty, while ensuring that a party does not benefit from their own manifest wrong or unilateral desertion; subsequent events may also be considered.

Physical separation alone does not constitute a ground for divorce, but may be assessed with the surrounding circumstances to determine whether statutory cruelty is established.

The Court considered the separation of more than ten years, the absence of any resumption of matrimonial life, the parties’ serious allegations and counter-allegations, and the lack of a meaningful marital relationship cumulatively.

It held that the Family Court had not adequately considered this cumulative effect by examining the allegations of cruelty individually.

Although the wife had voluntarily left the matrimonial residence, that fact alone did not resolve whether cruelty had been established in light of the entire relationship and the parties’ subsequent conduct.

The Court therefore found cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia), while clarifying that its conclusion was not based on physical separation alone.

Having granted relief on cruelty, it did not independently determine the desertion ground.

No order for alimony was made.