Prolonged separation and refusal to consent to divorce may constitute mental cruelty warranting dissolution.

The appellant-husband and respondent-wife married according to Hindu customary rites on 25 November 2019 at Kirateshwar Shivalaya Mandir, Legship, Gyalshing, Sikkim, and had a daughter who was five years old at the time of judgment.

The parties had lived separately for more than two years.

The husband instituted a divorce petition under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging cruelty and desertion.

The Family Court, Gyalshing, dismissed the petition on the ground that the alleged statutory grounds had not been proved.

During the matrimonial appeal, the High Court attempted reconciliation, following which the parties executed a Deed of Compromise dated 8 July 2026.

The husband paid the wife ₹15,00,000, and the terms of settlement were placed before the Court through a joint application in I.A. No. 02 of 2026.

Whether the High Court could dissolve the marriage where the specific allegations of cruelty and desertion had not been proved before the Family Court, but the parties’ prolonged separation and failed reconciliation demonstrated that the marriage had irretrievably broken down?

Whether the respondent’s withholding of consent to the proposed dissolution, in the circumstances of a failed and unworkable marriage, could constitute mental cruelty to the appellant?

Whether the Deed of Compromise could be incorporated into and form part of the decree of divorce?

The Court applied the grounds of cruelty and desertion under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, read with the appellate jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

It relied on Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558, for the principle that prolonged separation, irretrievable breakdown, and an adamant refusal to consent to divorce may, in appropriate circumstances, amount to mental cruelty.

Relying on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, the Court recognised that long continuous separation may establish that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair and that refusal to sever the legal tie may itself cause mental cruelty.

K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 was relied upon for the principle that although irretrievable breakdown is not an independent statutory ground under the Hindu Marriage Act, a marriage that is dead and incapable of revival may justify severance of the matrimonial tie.

The Court also referred to V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (Mrs), (1994) 1 SCC 337, which permits irretrievable breakdown to be considered while assessing proved grounds and the appropriate relief.

The Court also referred to the Kerala High Court decisions in Beena M.S. v. Shino G. Babu, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 778, and Sreedharan v. Ahsa, 2023:KER:55324, concerning incompatibility, failed matrimonial relationships, and withholding consent to separation as circumstances relevant to cruelty.

The High Court noted that the allegations made by the appellant had not been proved, but considered the undisputed circumstances that the parties had been separated for more than two years, had been unable to resume cohabitation, and had failed to reconcile despite the Court’s intervention.

The parties’ execution of a compromise and the husband’s payment of ₹15,00,000 further demonstrated that they had accepted the practical end of the matrimonial relationship.

Applying the principles in Naveen Kohli, Samar Ghosh, and K. Srinivas Rao, the Court held that continuation of a marriage which had become unworkable and irretrievably broken down would serve no useful purpose.

It treated the respondent’s refusal to consent to dissolution, in the context of the failed marriage and prolonged separation, as conduct capable of constituting mental cruelty.

The Court therefore exercised its appellate jurisdiction to grant divorce notwithstanding the Family Court’s finding that the pleaded allegations had not been established.

The Deed of Compromise dated 8 July 2026, filed with I.A. No. 02 of 2026, was directed to form part of the decree, and both parties were ordered to abide by its terms.

The appeal was accordingly disposed of, with the trial-court records directed to be remitted to the Family Court.