Promise to marry later withdrawn due to mother’s objection not enough for BNS Section 69 offence absent initial deceit: Supreme Court

The appellant was accused under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). The complainant alleged that the appellant developed a relationship with her through a digital platform, promised to marry her, and established physical relations with her, but subsequently refused to marry her because his mother was opposed to the marriage.

The alleged physical relations occurred in February and April 2024, including a two-day hotel stay. An FIR, being No. 11196030250292 dated 20 May 2025, was registered at Sayajiganh Police Station, Vadodara City, Gujarat. The Gujarat High Court declined to quash the FIR, relying principally on Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [(2013) 7 SCC 675]. The appellant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court.

Whether the allegations in the FIR disclosed the deceitful conduct required to constitute an offence under Section 69 of the BNS, particularly a promise to marry made without any intention of fulfilling it.

Whether the continuation of criminal proceedings was justified where the allegations indicated a consensual relationship and the refusal to marry was subsequently attributed to the appellant’s mother’s opposition.

The Court applied Section 69 of the BNS, which criminalises sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means or through a promise to marry made without any intention of fulfilling it.

The Court held that the provision requires the promise to have been made with the intention, from the outset, never to fulfil it; a later failure to marry due to genuine or unavoidable circumstances does not, by itself, establish the offence.

The Court relied on Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, which held that criminal liability requires adequate material showing that the accused had no intention to marry at the time the promise was made, and that a subsequent inability or refusal to fulfil a bona fide promise does not necessarily amount to a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the IPC.

The Court also distinguished the earlier IPC framework, under which a false promise to marry was examined in the context of rape under Section 375 read with Section 90 IPC, from the distinct offence created by Section 69 BNS.

The Court examined the FIR as a whole and found that it described a relationship that began through a digital platform, developed into a friendship and love affair, and involved repeated physical relations.

The complaint stated that the appellant expressed his desire to marry the complainant at their first physical meeting, but it did not specifically allege that the complainant permitted intercourse solely because of a promise to marry. Instead, the FIR indicated that she “succumbed to his entreaties,” which, in the Court’s view, supported the existence of a consensual relationship rather than inducement through deceit.

Further, the allegation that the appellant later refused marriage because his mother did not approve suggested that the promise, if made, was not shown to have been dishonest from the beginning.

Mere communication of an intention or desire to marry, without evidence of an initial intention never to fulfil that promise, did not satisfy Section 69 BNS.

The appeal was allowed, and FIR No. 11196030250292 dated 20 May 2025, registered at Sayajiganh Police Station, Vadodara City, Gujarat, was quashed. Pending applications, if any, were rejected.