Promptly challenged discharge based on partial colour blindness cannot be sustained.

The appellant was appointed as a Police Constable/Lokrakshak on 13 July 2013. During training, he suffered a leg injury on 15 December 2013 and was unable to attend the training camp. After recovering, he sought permission to resume duty and was permitted to do so by order dated 28 January 2016. He was subsequently unable to complete training following surgery, and his name was removed from the training course. In disciplinary proceedings concerning alleged unauthorised absence, the authorities treated 739 days as medical leave without salary.

After resuming duty in August 2017, the appellant underwent an eye examination and was diagnosed with partial colour blindness. The Board of Referees declared him medically unfit on 1 August 2017, and he was discharged from service by order dated 29 December 2017. His writ petition challenging the discharge was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that he was medically unfit. The appellant preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal, relying on earlier decisions holding that partial colour blindness could not by itself render a selected candidate unfit for appointment.

1. Whether the appellant could be discharged from service solely on the ground of partial colour blindness after he had been permitted to resume duty.

2. Whether the appellant’s claim was liable to be rejected on the ground of delay, on the basis that similarly situated employees had been treated as fence-sitters.

3. Whether, upon setting aside the discharge order, the appellant was entitled to consequential service benefits from the date of his original appointment.

The Court applied the principle laid down in Special Civil Application No. 7595 of 2013, as affirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1136 of 2018 and by the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) Diary No. 12397 of 2020, that a selected candidate could not be treated as medically unfit or discharged merely because of partial colour blindness.

The Court also applied the doctrine that delayed claims by fence-sitters, who approach the court only after another person obtains favourable relief, may be rejected on the ground of delay; however, that principle does not apply where the claimant approaches the court immediately after the impugned order and the factual circumstances are distinct.

As to relief, the Court exercised its discretion to restrict consequential service benefits, holding that the appellant would be treated as a regular appointee only from the date of judgment and would receive no other benefits.

The Court distinguished the appellant’s case from delayed claims filed by fence-sitters. The appellant had initially been unable to complete training because of a leg injury, was later permitted to resume duty, and was examined for colour blindness only at that stage.

Since he had approached the Court immediately after his discharge, his case was not affected by the delay-based reasoning applied in other matters.

Applying the earlier binding decisions concerning partial colour blindness, the Court held that the ground relied upon for declaring the appellant unfit and discharging him was legally unsustainable.

Nevertheless, considering that the appellant was appointed in 2013, resumed duty only in 2017, and had remained out of service during the litigation, the Court limited the monetary and service consequences of the relief.

The appellant was directed to be treated as a regular appointee only from 18 August 2026, the date of judgment, and was denied all other consequential benefits, including benefits for the earlier period.

The Court further directed that the decision would not be treated as a precedent in any other case, and permitted direct service.