Proof of bribe demand is essential: mere recovery of money cannot sustain conviction, Supreme Court acquits two Gujarat officials

The complainant applied for an Income Certificate and alleged that A1, a Talati-cum-Mantri, demanded ₹120—₹100 for himself and ₹20 for A2, a Gram Panchayat peon—for processing the certificate.

After repeated interactions, the complainant approached the Anti-Corruption Bureau, which organised a trap on 19 February 1996.

The complainant received the Income Certificate from A1 and gave a ₹20 currency note to A2; no amount was paid to or recovered from A1.

The trial court convicted both appellants under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, but acquitted them of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC.

The High Court affirmed the convictions and dismissed the State’s appeal for enhancement of sentence.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that A1 demanded ₹120 as illegal gratification and that the payment of ₹20 to A2 established the alleged bribery offence against either appellant?

Whether the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, could be drawn merely from the recovery of ₹20 from A2 when demand had not been proved?

Whether the sanction for prosecuting A1 was invalid because it was granted by the Deputy District Development Officer rather than the authority competent to remove him from service?

The Court applied Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which require proof of the essential ingredients of demand and acceptance or obtaining of illegal gratification; mere recovery or possession of currency is insufficient without proof connecting it to a corrupt demand.

Section 20 creates a statutory presumption only after the prosecution first proves the foundational fact of demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt; it cannot arise solely from recovery of money.

The Court relied on N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 INSC 60, for this principle.

It also relied on State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B. Nagaraj, 2025 INSC 736, for the proposition that payment made after the public duty has been performed does not ipso facto establish that it was pursuant to a prior demand.

Under Section 19(1)(c), sanction must be granted by the authority competent to remove the public servant from office; an order issued by an incompetent authority is invalid.

The Court found material doubt in the complainant’s version of demand.

His testimony in the present case differed from his earlier deposition, in which he stated that A1 had initially demanded ₹200 and that ₹120 was later agreed as a settlement.

Although the complainant had been instructed to hand over the entire ₹120 upon demand, he gave only ₹20 to A2.

A2 did not ask why he was receiving ₹20 when A1 had allegedly directed payment of ₹120, and A2 himself was found not to have made any demand.

The certificate had already been prepared and handed over before the payment was made, further weakening the prosecution’s claim that the money was paid pursuant to an illegal demand.

The Court therefore held that demand by A1 was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that recovery of the ₹20 note from A2 could not independently sustain the convictions or trigger Section 20’s presumption.

It additionally held that A1’s sanction was invalid because the prosecution failed to establish that the Deputy District Development Officer was competent to remove a Talati-cum-Mantri; that power lay with the District Development Officer.

However, the Court expressly stated that it was not setting aside the conviction solely on the sanction ground, since the evidence independently failed to prove the charges.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove the foundational demand of illegal gratification by A1, that no demand by A2 was established, and that recovery of ₹20 from A2 neither proved the offences nor attracted the presumption under Section 20.

The sanction for A1’s prosecution was also held invalid under Section 19(1)(c).

The convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court were set aside, and both appellants were acquitted of the offences under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Their appeals were allowed and their bail bonds were cancelled.