Proposed reconstruction does not negate bona fide residential requirement under Section 14(1)(e).

The Petitioners-tenants filed a revision petition under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, challenging the order dated 13 February 2026 of the learned CCJ-cum-ARC, Central District, Delhi, in Mohammad Haroon v. Afzal Baig & Ors. , whereby eviction was ordered on the ground of the landlord’s bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act.

The challenge before the High Court was confined to the alleged absence of bona fide requirement.

The Petitioners relied on a Collaboration Agreement dated 7 September 2018 between the Respondent’s brother and a builder for reconstruction of the entire premises, including the tenanted first floor.

They contended that the subsequent Cancellation Agreement dated 6 November 2018 was an afterthought and that the Respondent had concealed material facts by failing to examine the builder and his brother, Sharful Islam.

The learned ARC held that the Collaboration Agreement had been cancelled and, in any event, that proposed reconstruction did not negate the landlord’s bona fide residential requirement under Section 14(1)(e).

1. Whether the learned ARC erred in holding that the Respondent’s bona fide requirement was established despite the Collaboration Agreement for reconstruction of the premises and the subsequent Cancellation Agreement?

2. Whether the alleged concealment of the Collaboration Agreement and the Respondent’s failure to examine the builder or his brother constituted a jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act?

3. Whether the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8), could reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own view for that of the learned ARC?

The Court applied the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, holding that the High Court’s jurisdiction is supervisory and revisional, not appellate; interference is warranted only for jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, an error apparent on the face of the record, or failure to adjudicate a material plea.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. , (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh , (2014) 9 SCC 78; Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , (2022) 6 SCC 30; Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , 2024:DHC:9322; and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover , 2025:DHC:11285, the Court reiterated that the revisional court cannot conduct a fresh factual appraisal merely because another view is possible.

On the substantive issue, the Court relied on Vijay Kumar Farshwal v. Kishan Lal , RC.REV. 540/2018, and Sharifuddin v. Babuddin & Anr. , 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1256, for the principle that reconstruction or alteration of premises intended to make them suitable for the landlord’s bona fide use does not, by itself, convert an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) into one under Section 14(1)(g).

The High Court found that the learned ARC had expressly considered both the Collaboration Agreement and the Cancellation Agreement and had concluded that the former was no longer operative.

Independently, the ARC had held that even if the Collaboration Agreement were taken into account, it did not state that the reconstructed premises could not be used by the Respondent for his bona fide residential requirement.

Therefore, the proposed reconstruction did not negate the statutory requirement under Section 14(1)(e) or make the eviction petition non-maintainable.

The Petitioners’ challenge to the Cancellation Agreement as an afterthought was held not to affect the outcome because the ARC’s alternative reasoning remained valid even assuming that the Collaboration Agreement continued to be relevant.

The failure to examine the builder or Sharful Islam was treated as an evidentiary matter and did not demonstrate that the ARC’s findings were based on no evidence, contrary to material evidence, perverse, or legally infirm.

Reassessing the documentary evidence and drawing a different inference would amount to an impermissible appellate review under Section 25-B(8).

The existence, alleged concealment, or cancellation of the Collaboration Agreement did not invalidate the Respondent’s bona fide residential requirement, and the non-examination of the builder or the Respondent’s brother did not warrant an adverse inference sufficient to invoke revisional jurisdiction.

The revision petition and all pending applications were accordingly dismissed.