Public Figures Must Tolerate Satirical AI Content unless it Transgresses into Gross Profanity or Personal Indignity

The Plaintiff, a Member of Parliament and public figure, filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction against unknown defendants (John Doe) and intermediary platforms.

The Plaintiff alleged that after his political defection from the AAP to the BJP, a malicious campaign was launched using Generative AI and deepfake technology to create hyper-realistic audio-visual content portraying him in a negative light.

The Plaintiff initially sought reliefs based on "personality rights" and "defamation".

However, during proceedings, the Plaintiff's counsel abandoned arguments regarding personality rights, confining the prayer for interim relief to the issue of defamation specifically concerning 52 documents annexed to the plaint.

The Court applied the three-pronged test for interim injunctions under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

It relied on the Bonnard v. Perryman principle, which cautions against restraining alleged libel before its falsity is established.

This was supported by Bloomberg TV v. Zee Entertainment, holding that ex-parte injunctions should be granted only in exceptional cases where the content is "palpably false".

Regarding public figures, the court cited Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab and R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., establishing that public officials must not be "thin-skinned" and must tolerate searching criticism, as stifling such speech amounts to political censorship.

Furthermore, Naveen Jindal v. Zee Media affirmed that while AI and media content may be inaccurate or annoying, they are not restrainable unless "grossly defamatory per se".

The Court noted that while personality rights protect against commercial misappropriation, the Plaintiff's shift to a defamation-based argument required a higher evidentiary threshold.

Applying the "thick-skinned" doctrine for public officials, the Court analyzed the 52 documents and found that the majority related to political choices and party alliances, which constitute "satirical expressions" protected as freedom of speech in a democracy.

The Court reasoned that political satire is an inevitable appendage to public office and does not automatically meet the threshold of defamation.

However, the Court distinguished between "harmless satirical humor" and content that is "profane and vulgar," finding that six specific documents (Nos. 2, 8, 9, 11, 25, and 40) crossed the threshold of decency and struck at the root of the individual’s right to dignity under Article 21.

The Court directed Defendants No. 2 (Meta) and 4 to take down the URLs associated with Documents No. 2, 8, 9, 11, 25, and 40 within two weeks.

It further ordered the intermediaries to provide the Plaintiff with the Basic Subscriber Information (BSI) and IP logs of the accounts responsible for those specific documents to unmask the anonymous infringers.

Relief as to the remaining 46 documents was denied.