Public Premises Act overrides State Rent Control Acts regarding eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises.

The suit premises (Shop No. 1, Pune) were originally owned by the Bank of Karad.

In 1972, the District Court ordered the eviction of the then-tenant, Dattatray Doiphode, under Section 13(1)(hh) of the Bombay Rent Act for demolition/reconstruction, but the execution petition was dismissed in 1989 for failure to take steps.

In 1992, the Petitioner entered into an "Assignment Agreement" with the tenant to purchase goodwill and occupancy rights without the landlord's consent.

The Bank of Karad subsequently merged with the Respondent, Bank of India, in 1994.

In 2019, the Bank issued an eviction notice under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act (PP Act) on grounds of unauthorized occupation, 47 years of non-payment of rent, and bona fide requirement.

The Estate Officer ordered eviction, which was confirmed by the District Judge in 2021.

The Petitioner challenged these orders under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the protection of State Rent Control Legislations is available to a tenant once the premises become "public premises" under the PP Act.

Whether the eviction notice was invalid due to vagueness or a typographical error regarding the hearing date.

Whether the finding of a Rent Court on bona fide requirement operates as res judicata against subsequent proceedings by a Public Sector Bank under the PP Act.

The Court applied the overriding effect of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, over State Rent Acts.

It relied on the Constitution Bench decision in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank.

It relied on the Three-Judge Bench decision in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Vita, which held that the PP Act is a special statute meant for public authorities and prevails over State Rent Control Acts.

It further clarified that a person in unauthorized occupation cannot invoke Rent Act protection.

Regarding res judicata, the court held that bona fide requirement is a "continuous phenomenon" under Section 22 of the Limitation Act.

Finally, it applied the limited scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution as defined in Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel.

The Court found that the premises became "public premises" upon the Bank of India's acquisition of the assets.

Applying LIC v. Vita, the Court rejected the Petitioner’s argument that he remained a "protected tenant" under the Bombay Rent Act, concluding that the PP Act overrides such protections once occupation becomes unauthorized.

The Court dismissed the challenge to the notice's validity, noting that the Petitioner had replied to the notice on merits and suffered no prejudice from the typographical error in the year.

On the merits of unauthorized occupation, the Court observed that the Petitioner’s entry via the 1992 Assignment Agreement was an "indirect subletting" without landlord consent.

Furthermore, the admitted non-payment of rent for 47 years and the fact that a third party (Supriya Kamble) was now running a different business in the premises established a clear case of unauthorized occupation.

The court held that prior Rent Court findings did not bar the Bank’s current claim as requirements evolve over time.

The Court upheld the orders of the Estate Officer and the District Judge, holding that there was no jurisdictional error or perversity.

The Writ Petition was dismissed, and the request for a stay on the judgment was rejected.