Punishment imposed by an authority lacking jurisdiction is void, despite subsequent board approval or the employee's age.

The respondent, an employee of the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board, was subjected to a departmental inquiry where charges against him were found established by the Inquiry Officer.

The inquiry report was placed before the Member Secretary, who accepted the findings and passed an order of dismissal.

The respondent’s subsequent appeal to the Board was rejected.

He challenged these actions before a learned Single Judge, who found that the Member Secretary lacked the jurisdictional competence to impose punishment, as that power vested solely with the Board.

Observing that the respondent was 75 years old and had completed 31 years of service, the Single Judge directed the Board to treat him as having retired voluntarily after 30 years of service with notional benefits.

The Board moved this Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against that judgment.

1. Whether the Member Secretary of the Board possessed the delegated authority to impose the punishment of dismissal upon the respondent.

2. Whether the High Court, under Article 226, can substitute a punishment of dismissal with voluntary retirement to "lay quietus" to a dispute involving an elderly litigant.

The court applied the principle that an authority must act within the scope of its statutory or delegated powers, noting that a subsequent approval by a superior body (the Board) implies the absence of an initial delegation of power.

The court relied on the Supreme Court precedent in Union of India v. Y.S. Sandhu (2008) 12 SCC 30, which holds that if a departmental inquiry is vitiated by a technical defect, the proceedings should generally resume from the stage where the defect occurred.

The court invoked the principle of equity and finality to resolve disputes where the age of the litigant makes reinstatement or fresh inquiry practically impossible.

The Court rejected the Appellant’s argument that power had been delegated to the Member Secretary. It observed that the Member Secretary's act of seeking subsequent approval from the Board for the dismissal order proved that no prior delegation existed; if he were truly empowered, no such approval would be necessary.

The Board’s decision to hear an appeal against the Member Secretary’s order confirmed that they viewed him as the primary disciplinary authority, which was legally incorrect.

Regarding the relief, the Court noted that while technical defects usually lead to a fresh inquiry from the stage of the defect, the respondent's advanced age (81 years at the time of appeal) made a remand for fresh proceedings "not fair" and impermissible.

The Court found the Single Judge's directive for voluntary retirement to be a pragmatic solution to end a decades-old dispute.

The Court directed the Board to give effect to the order permitting the respondent to retire voluntarily upon completion of 30 years of service and to process the consequential retirement benefits within eight weeks.

The respondent was denied actual arrears of salary from the date of dismissal to retirement but granted notional fixation for pensionary benefits.