Pursuit of Incorrect Procedural Remedies Does Not Constitute Sufficient Cause for Condoning Inordinate Delay under Section 5.

The applicants are administrators of a Mahadev Temple whose lands were acquired for road widening under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The Land Acquisition Officer fixed the market value at Rs. 2.04/sq.m.

On 09.03.2018, the Reference Court dismissed the applicants’ reference cases, confirming the original award.

Instead of filing a First Appeal, the applicants pursued Review Applications, which were dismissed on 14.03.2024.

They subsequently filed a Special Civil Application before the High Court, which was also dismissed with the observation that a First Appeal was the proper remedy.

Consequently, the applicants filed these First Appeals with a delay of 2714 days (approximately 7.5 years), seeking condonation under Section 5 and exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

1. Whether the time spent in prosecuting a Review Application and a Special Civil Application under a mistaken choice of forum can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

2. Whether the applicants established "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay of over 2700 days.

The court primarily applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which requires the applicant to show "sufficient cause" for delay.

It also interpreted Section 14, requiring "due diligence" and "good faith" (as defined in Section 2(h)) when prosecuting proceedings in a court lacking jurisdiction.

The court relied on Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, which holds that while a liberal approach is balanced against "gross negligence," inordinate delay warrants a stricter approach.

Furthermore, Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector was cited to establish that the law of limitation is based on public policy and that merits of a case are irrelevant to condonation.

The court found that the applicants failed to meet the threshold of "due diligence" and "good faith" required for Section 14.

Although the applicants claimed they were "villagers and trustees" and were misled by legal procedures, the court noted that the Land Acquisition Act is a self-contained code with an explicit remedy of First Appeal.

Pursueing a Review Application after the Reference Court judgment was deemed a strategic choice rather than a "defect of jurisdiction" or a "bona fide mistake".

The court emphasized that a "liberal approach" cannot be used to "jettison the substantial law of limitation".

The court observed that 7.5 years is a "colossal delay" and the reasons provided—lack of funds and legal ignorance—were vague, general, and insufficient to overturn the rights accrued to the State through the finality of the original award.

The court refused the registration of the First Appeals and discharged the Rule.

Discretionary power to condone delay cannot be exercised in cases of gross negligence or where a party slumbers over their rights despite the availability of clear statutory remedies.