Quashing is unwarranted where charge-sheet material supports prosecution and the defence raises disputed factual issues.

The complainant alleged that, after he entrusted his tractor to accused Nos. 1–3 to arrange a sale, they neither returned it nor paid the agreed consideration.

He further alleged that they, in collusion with accused Nos. 4–6, tampered with the tractor’s chassis and engine numbers and sold it to a third party.

The alleged incident occurred on 10 September 2015; the complaint was lodged on 13 October 2016.

Following investigation, a charge sheet was filed for offences under Sections 406, 420 and 468 of the IPC.

Accused Nos. 2 and 3 petitioned under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the proceedings, relying, among other things, on the delay and the asserted absence of material connecting them to the offences.

Section 528 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 of the CrPC) preserves the High Court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of court and secure the ends of justice.

As stated in Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra, that power is broad but must be exercised sparingly and with circumspection, not arbitrarily; quashing is appropriate where the material shows that continuation would be an abuse of process or that the ends of justice require it.

The alleged offences were under Sections 406, 420 and 468 of the IPC.

The Court also considered Arshad Neyaz Khan v. State of Jharkhand, distinguishing it as involving a failed agreement for sale followed by a criminal complaint, rather than the allegations in this case.

The Court found that the complainant had explained the delay by stating that he waited for the tractor’s return or repayment of the consideration before approaching the police.

It also considered the charge-sheet material, which prima facie indicated that accused Nos. 1–3 had taken possession of the tractor and allegedly participated in its subsequent sale after its identifying numbers were tampered with.

Because the petitioners’ challenges raised disputed questions of fact and the material disclosed sufficient grounds to proceed, the Court held that those matters should not be adjudicated in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.

It found Arshad Neyaz Khan distinguishable on its facts.

The criminal petition was dismissed; any pending interlocutory applications were disposed of, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the trial and dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, in accordance with law.