Quashing of summons under Section 482 CrPC is impermissible where factual disputes require evaluation of evidence during trial.

The Petitioner, a former director of the Opposite Party (OP) company, resigned on 09.10.2023 after a board resolution where he agreed to transfer shares in exchange for ₹1,30,00,000/-.

The Petitioner claims a debt remains, whereas the OP asserts full payment was made.

On 22.04.2024, the OP's Managing Director was alerted by ICICI Bank regarding a high-value cheque of ₹75,00,000/- presented by the Petitioner.

The OP alleges the Petitioner illegally retained and forged this cheque from a book used in 2022 while he was an authorized signatory.

Consequently, the Petitioner filed a complaint (1CC No. 5401 of 2024) under the N.I. Act and IPC, while the OP filed a counter-complaint (1CC No. 6144 of 2024) alleging forgery and criminal breach of trust.

The Petitioner approached the High Court seeking to quash the summons issued by the S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar, in the OP's counter-case.

1. Whether the criminal proceedings against the Petitioner for forgery and cheating ought to be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the dispute is civil/commercial in nature.

2. Whether the court should interfere at the preliminary stage of summoning when factual disputes regarding the validity of a debt and the authenticity of a cheque exist.

The court applied the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 BNSS) meant to prevent abuse of process.

It relied on the landmark principles from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which define categories where quashing is permissible.

It applied the doctrine from Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, prohibiting the High Court from conducting a "mini-trial" at the quashing stage.

It followed Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), which establishes that when legal presumptions exist and facts are contested, the quashing court should not separate "wheat from the chaff" but allow the trial court to evaluate evidence.

The court reasoned that the allegations in the complaint—specifically the fraudulent presentation of a cheque allegedly retained without authority—prima facie disclose cognizable offences including criminal breach of trust (Sec. 406 IPC) and forgery (Sec. 465, 467, 468 IPC).

The Court noted that the Learned S.D.J.M. had conducted the requisite inquiry under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. before issuing summons.

It observed that the existence of a business transaction or a parallel proceeding under Section 138 of the N.I. Act does not bar prosecution for independent criminal acts like forgery arising from the same transaction.

Per Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan, the Court emphasized that scuttling criminal process at a "nascent stage" when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed would be injudicious and might grant the accused an unmerited advantage.

The Court held that at the preliminary stage, if the complaint discloses the commission of an offence, the truth of the allegations must be determined through a trial rather than a summary evaluation of merits by the High Court.

The parties were directed to comply with the summons and any interim orders were vacated.