Quashing petition disposed without merits, with liberty to pursue appropriate remedy before the competent forum.

Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 concerning dishonour of a cheque before the trial court.

After documentary evidence had concluded in 2011, the complainant filed an affidavit-in-chief on 10 April 2012. The applicant’s advocate commenced cross-examination on 12 June 2014.

During the ongoing cross-examination, the complainant filed an application at Exh. 29 on 5 August 2014 seeking permission to produce additional documents, which the trial court allowed on the same day. The complainant thereafter filed Exh. 30 on 1 October 2014 seeking recall as a witness; that application was also allowed.

The applicant challenged the trial court’s orders and the revisional court’s order before the High Court, seeking quashing of those orders and a stay of further proceedings.

Whether the High Court should quash the impugned orders permitting the complainant to produce additional documents and recalling him as a witness during cross-examination?

Whether, in view of the complainant’s alleged non-appearance and refusal to accept notice, the High Court should grant further relief concerning the pending Section 138 complaint?

Whether the proceedings should be finally terminated or otherwise interfered with despite the matter not having been examined on its merits?

The complaint arose under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which provides the statutory basis for prosecution for dishonour of a cheque.

The governing principle applied was that, in the circumstances presented, the Court could dispose of the application without entering into the merits while reserving the applicant’s liberty to pursue an appropriate remedy before the competent forum.

The Court noted the procedural history of the complaint, including the complainant’s applications for production of additional documents and recall as a witness during cross-examination.

Although the applicant argued that the complainant was no longer interested in pursuing the complaint and had refused service before the High Court, the Court did not adjudicate the validity of the trial court’s orders or the merits of the Section 138 complaint.

Instead, it considered that any further substantive challenge should be pursued before the appropriate forum in accordance with law.

The notice was discharged, and the ad-interim relief previously granted was vacated.

No order was made quashing the impugned orders or terminating the underlying complaint.