Quashment of FIR for serious sexual offences and POCSO is impermissible on grounds of settlement.

The applicants sought to quash FIR No. I-CR 35/2019, registered at Dhrol Police Station, Jamnagar, for offences under Sections 363, 366, 506(2), and 114 of the IPC and Section 135(1) of the Gujarat Police Act

The minor victim, aged 17 at the time of the 2019 incident, was abducted by the applicants for illicit purposes

Although the complainant reported the matter immediately, the police allegedly pressured her to withdraw, leading to a two-month delay in registering the FIR

The victim was recovered four years later, in July 2023, and gave a statement alleging she was gang-raped by the accused

Despite this statement, the investigating officers failed to conduct a forensic medical examination, record a statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., or incorporate charges under the POCSO Act

The applicants sought quashing on the grounds that a settlement had been reached and the victim, now an adult, consented to the quashing

The Court applied Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, which preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of process

It relied on the precedent Hiteshbhai Urfe Bholo Gopalbhai Kadivar v. State of Gujarat (2024), which held that FIRs involving Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act cannot be quashed based on compromise

the court followed the guidelines established in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) regarding the limitations of exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings

The Court scrutinized the "gravamen and seriousness" of the offence, noting that the victim’s statement explicitly detailed sexual violence despite the investigating authority's failure to add formal POCSO or rape charges

The Court observed that the initial investigation was marred by "serious dereliction of duty" and "unusual facts" suggesting police misconduct, which led the Superintendent of Police to suspend and charge-sheet multiple officers

The Court reasoned that the inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS (formerly Section 482 Cr.P.C.) cannot be used to "dilute the serious nature" of crimes against minors

It concluded that since a prima facie case of abduction and sexual assault existed, the prosecution must be allowed to prove its case at trial through evidence, rather than allowing a settlement to terminate the proceedings

The Court found no grounds to exercise its discretionary power to quash the FIR, as the materials on record did not suggest false implication but rather a prima facie case requiring trial

the Court expressed satisfaction with the disciplinary actions taken by the Superintendent of Police against the erring investigating officers